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Department of Economics
In this dissertation I study the development of urban areas. At the aggregate
level I investigate how they may be affected by climate change policies and by being
designated the seat of governmental power. At the household level I study with
coauthors how microfinance could improve the health of urban residents.
In Chapter 1, I investigate how local employment may be affected by electricity
price increases, which is a likely consequence of climate change policies. I outline how
previous studies that find large, negative effects may be biased. To overcome these
biases I develop a novel estimation strategy that blends border-pair regressions with
the synthetic control methodology. I show the conditions for consistent estimation.
Using this estimator, I find no effect of contemporaneous price changes on employment.
Consistent with the longer time-frame for manufacturing decisions, I do find evidence
for negative effects from perceived permanent price shocks. These estimates are much
smaller than previous research has found.
National capital cities are often substantially larger than other cities in their
countries. In Chapter 2, I investigate whether there is a causal effect from being a
capital by studying the 1960 relocation of the Brazilian capital from Rio de Janeiro
to Brasília. Using a synthetic controls strategy I find that losing the capital had no
significant effects on Rio de Janeiro in terms of population, employment, or gross
domestic product (GDP). I find that Brasília experienced large and significant increases
in population, employment, and GDP. I find evidence of large spillovers from the
public to the private sector.
Chapter 3 investigates how microfinance could increase the uptake of costly
health goods. We study the effect of time payments (micro-loans or micro-savings) on
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a water filter among households in the slums of Dhaka,
Bangladesh. We find that time payments significantly increase WTP: compared to a
lump-sum up-front purchase, median WTP increases 83% with a six-month loan and
115% with a 12-month loan. We find that households are quite patient with respect to
consumption of health inputs. We find evidence for the presence of credit and savings
constraints.
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Chapter 1: The Effects of Energy Prices on Manufacturing Employment
1.1 Introduction
Understanding how local employment in electricity-intensive sectors, such as
manufacturing, is affected by electricity prices is important for understanding both the
potential effects of carbon policies on employment and the geographic concentration
of employment. Existing best estimates of this elasticity may be biased by spill-overs
between counties in the same labor markets and by selecting low-quality counterfactuals.
I develop a new identification strategy to reduce these potential biases and provide
new estimates.
Many national policies have differential local impacts due to variations in local
context. The Clean Power Plan (CPP), the US’s largest climate change policy (released
on August 3rd, 2015)1 is no exception, and will likely affect areas differently because it
will affect electricity prices non-uniformly (EPA, 2014b) and because areas may differ
in their responses to electricity price changes. Existing studies of similar proposed
carbon policies have estimated a potential loss of 460,000 jobs (Deschenes, 2012). The
magnitude of these estimate suggests that further understanding of potential effects is
important for informed policy- and decision-making.
1A draft plan was announced on June 2, 2014. It was supplemented in October 28, 2014 to include
1
In addition to its importance in better understanding the implications of carbon
policy on employment, the elasticity of employment with respect to prices is important
for understanding the geographic concentration of employment. The geographic concen-
tration of manufacturing responds to competition among many locations (Greenstone
et al., 2010). This is especially true for manufacturing as output is not related to local
demand. Given electric utilities and prices are highly regulated by the government, it
would be useful for policy makers to know if they can use this regulatory authority to
attract manufacturing jobs.
Existing best estimates of the local elasticity of manufacturing jobs with respect
to electricity prices in the US are from Kahn and Mansur (2013). Their paper is
broad in scope and investigates how locations can have comparative advantages for
particular manufacturing industries by estimating the effects from electricity prices,
environmental regulations, and labor laws. They attempt to remove confounding
omitted variables by differencing neighboring counties with each other using a county
border-pair design. They find significant negative elasticities between employment
and electricity prices, which are quite large for some subsectors. While their design is
an improvement upon state-level panel estimates, their estimates may be biased given
that neighboring counties may not be independent from each other and may not be
similar enough in terms of unobservables to serve as adequate counterfactuals for each
other.
To address these limitations, I develop a new identification strategy that dif-
ferences away omitted variables by selecting weighted averages of non-neighboring
Indian country and multi-jurisdiction partnerships.
2
counties so that the counterfactuals are observably similar in previous outcomes and
covariates. This can improve the match quality of the counterfactual and decreases
the chance of interference between counties. Using this new method I find contempo-
raneous employment elasticities much closer to zero. These small elasticities could be
due to either the basic technology of substitution between factors or due to sluggish
responses. Slow or delayed adjustment can be caused by costly adjustment of factors
or expectations of future prices. Addressing this latter reason, I investigate whether
firms are responsive to perceived permanent changes to the electricity price level. I
find significant negative results, but much smaller estimates than previously found in
the literature.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature on this elasticity
as well as related identification strategies. Section 1.3 covers the new identification
strategy and how it is estimated. Section 1.4 covers the results. Section 1.5 discusses
implications of the estimates and other uses of the identification strategy. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section I review the literature on both the elasticity of employment with
respect to electricity prices and on similar identification strategies.
To define the elasticity of interest, suppose the manufacturing production function
is Y = F (K,L,E) where K is capital, L is labor, E is electricity, and F is linear
homogeneous. The cross-partial elasticity of labor demand with respect to electricity
3
(pE) holding output and other input prices constant is ηLE = ∂ lnL/∂ ln pE. One can
show that
ηLE = sEσLE
where sE is the cost-share of energy and σLE = ∂ ln(E/L)∂ ln(pL/pE) is the partial elasticity of
substitution holding constant output and other input prices. With more than two
factors however, the signs can not be determined from theory.2 Two factors, such as
labor and energy, are (p-)substitutes if ηLE > 0 and compliments if ηLE < 0.
There have been many estimates of this elasticity using manufacturing employ-
ment given it is a sector that is likely to be affected by electricity prices due to its
high usage and because it is also a crucial intermediary sector (e.g., Linn (2009) finds
that manufacturing linkages amplify macro shocks). Earlier estimates of the elasticity
were based on large sector aggregates or the full economy where the assumption of
long-run equilibrium and constant output are plausible. Hamermesh (1993) reviews
these estimates, noting that they find that energy price increases weakly increased
employment with the elasticity being positive and small (less than 0.2).
If output is not held constant then there is a scale effect so that
η′LE = ηLE − sEη
2Since ηii < 0, and by homogeneity
∑
j ηij = 0 (since factor demands in all factor prices are
homogeneous of degree zero), then at least one cross-partial elasticity is positive.
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where η is the product demand elasticity. This implies that η′LE < ηLE with η′LE < 0
possible even if ηLE > 0. In a setting dealing with smaller geographic areas, narrower
sectors, or more short-run time-horizons, then relaxing the assumption of constant
output is more justified. The difference between ηLE and η′LE, however, should not
be very large given that sE ≈ .05 and η ≈ 2 (Aigner and Chu, 1968). More recent
studies investigate η′LE directly in the United State and Europe. In the US, Deschenes
(2012) uses a state panel from 1976-2008 and finds significant negative employment
effects with elasticities of around -0.13. Kahn and Mansur (2013) (henceforth KM)
use a border-pair design for Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) counties from 1998
to 2009, separating employment into manufacturing sub-sectors and finds that the
elasticities range from 0.17 to -1.65 and are significantly correlated with sub-sectoral
energy intensity. In the EU there has been mixed evidence for negative employment
effects using variation from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme comparing size-eligible
vs size-ineligible firms (Chan et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2014; Abrell et al., 2011) and
from tax and electricity rate differences (Flues and Lutz, 2014; Martin et al., 2011;
Cox et al., 2013).
Studies of related effects have tended to find negative results. With regards to
environmental regulation, Greenstone (2002) finds negative employment effects of the
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs). Walker (2013), also investigating the CAAAs,
estimates significant earnings losses for workers in regulated sectors that transition
to other sectors. The macroeconomics literature has also investigated aggregate-level
effects of energy prices. The majority of the work utilizes oil-price shocks: see Davis
and Haltiwanger (2001) and the reviews of Hamilton (2008) and Kilian (2008). The
5
studies emphasize that a large component of the estimated effect is through changes
in consumer demand due to gas price changes and therefore their estimates are not
from electricity price shocks. One exception is Aldy and Pizer (2012) which estimate,
at a national-level, negative output effects due to international competitiveness from
changes in energy prices.
This paper advances a novel estimation strategy to limit bias from spatial depen-
dence. Two sources of such bias that I consider are: unobservable unit characteristics
causing omitted variable bias and that units may dynamically interact with each other
given they are spatially connected (for example, a change to the employment level of
one county may affect the level in a neighboring county). For unobservables character-
istics, a standard framework is to posit that the error term is decomposed as µcλt + ect
where there is a vector of factors λt each period and µc is a vector of unobserved
unit (county) characteristics sometimes called factor loadings. Correlation between
regressors and µcλt is allowed and units are correlated cross-sectionally through λt.
Ahn et al. (2001) provide a GMM estimator that is consistent given a factor model
but assume that regressors are i.i.d. across units, which may not be valid in practice.
Pesaran (2006) augments an estimated system of equations with generated regressors
which are cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables. Bai
(2009) uses an iterative process to step repeatedly between identifying the unobserved
factors using principal component methods and estimating the main coefficients.
Finally, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) provide a
matching strategy that removes unobserved factors when estimating the effect of a
binary treatment on a single unit in a case study methodology. This is generalized to
6
multiple treated units and multiple treatment periods by Cavallo et al. (2013). Zou
(2015) uses the matching procedure to eliminate unobserved factors from a group
of treated units using non-treated units and then estimates a first-differences cross-
sectional regression. I generalize the procedure to a panel setting and to the common
case where all units can experience changes in their covariates. Additionally, I modify
the matching strategy to disallow neighboring units from being compared to each other
to reduce the bias from local interactions.3 Very importantly, I derive the asymptotic
properties of the estimator proposed in this paper.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
Estimating the local effect of price changes using a state-level panel would be
biased by time-changing state policies affecting both employment and energy prices.
The state of the art method, therefore, is to employ a county border-pair design as
KM do. This estimation has a pair of observations for every pair of counties that
border each other, so that counties with multiple neighbors appear multiple times. The
estimation then conditions on pair fixed effects so that the relationship is estimated
from differences across the pair.
While this type of design has advantages, there are potentially a few concerns.
First, papers that utilize this design may have their comparisons biased by spillovers
or other interactions in prices or employment between nearby units. If neighboring
3If the only identification challenge was spatial spillovers, and a plausible distance metric was
available, then on could use methods from the spatial econometrics literature (for example, reviewed
in Anselin 2003) that explicitly models either the error structure (Cov[εi, εj ] = σ2f(dij , ρ)) or




counties share the same labor market, a shock to electricity prices in County A could
cause an employment change that comes at the expense of a neighboring County B
given that workers can commute between the two. This would cause the local effect to
be biased away from zero. This is a concern given that, in the US the median share of
workers from a metro county working in another county in the same metro area is
34.0% (American Community Survey 2009-2013). Similarly, if there are interactions
between counties with regards to electricity prices, estimates could also be biased.
If in the previous example, County B changes prices in a similar way as County A
(either strategically or because they have differing responses to common causes) then
the pair difference in prices is now smaller, resulting in increased bias. The bias can
increase with the inclusion of the pair fixed-effect as units become compared not to
the whole sample but to the unit with which they interact.
Another problem with the border-pairs approach is that it may exacerbate bias
if the match is not adequate. Using the factor model, if all units in the same MSA
m have the same unobserved characteristics (µc = µm∀c ∈ m), then differencing any
pair will eliminate bias from the factors. If counties differ in their characteristics
(µc = µm + µ̃c) then this differencing can increase rather than decrease bias. Suppose
that prices are determined by the omitted variable and an unobserved exogenous
variable, such as pct = α1(µcλt) + α2xct, and that the exogenous component also has
a regional and individual component (xct = xmt + x̃ct). Griliches (1979) shows that
bias is reduced by differencing only if the regional component accounts for a larger
fraction of the variance of µcλt than of xct, an assumption that may not hold in this
4This is a smaller concern with my alternative estimation strategy as I match to a counterfactual
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or other cross-county studies.4 Neumark (1999) also notes that instrumental variable
(IV) estimation can exacerbate this bias. Note that in a border-pair design, the match
quality does not increase with the addition of more data.5
The unobservables that are of concern are labor-market characteristics (e.g.,
unemployment trends), regulation environment (e.g., how pro-business the government
is), and market access. As these are likely to be cross-sectionally correlated they can
be well accommodated by a model of unobserved factors. The matching procedure of
the synthetic controls methodology (SCM) of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
Abadie et al. (2010) provides a way of reducing the bias from unobserved factors while
determining comparison groups in a way that may avoid bias from spillovers. I develop
a generalization of the SCM that is consistent in a panel setting.
To explain how this method attempts to control for unobservables, I start with
a data generating process (DGP) for county employment, which for now I’ve assumed
has only one sector of manufacturing,
lct = βxct + λtµc + εct ∀c, t (1.1)
where the vector xct (including prices and other controls) are known, λt is a (1× F )
vector of unobserved common factors, and µc is a (F × 1) vector of factor loadings
(λtµc are known as “interactive fixed-effects”). I assume εct are independent ∀(c, t),
that should be very close in terms of µc.
5Alternative models of course exist where border-pair designs eliminate bias but my estimation
strategy does not. For instance, there could be a single MSA-level confounder umt that impacts the
counties in an MSA equally with no other interactions between units. My estimation strategy will
recover common factors to the extent possible given the cross-sectional correlation of umt. In this
case the bias in synthetic regression reduces to zero as the cross-sectional correlation increases.
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the εct are mean independent of {µc}, that E[εct] = 0, and that the xct are strictly
exogenous given the interactive fixed-effects (xct ⊥ εct|λtµc). xct may be correlated
with the residual through the interactive fixed-effects.6
Interactive fixed effects generalize the controls of a standard panel model. They
can reproduce the panel fixed effects by having µc = (1, αc) and λt = (ξt, 1)′. They
also can accommodate autoregressive components: µc = (lc,0) and λt = (ρt)7; and
unit-specific time trends: µc = (αc) and λt = (t). This model allows for violations of
the common-trends assumption of difference-in-difference equations.
1.3.1 Synthetic Regression
Equation 1.1 is a similar DGP8 as that used in the classic SCM. The classic
SCM treats xct as binary, exogenous (conditional on observables and the interactive
fixed effects), and that only changes in one period. I extend that methodology to a
synthetic regression where xct may be continuous and change in multiple periods.
1.3.1.1 Estimation
Estimation proceeds in two steps, a match step (similar to SCM) and a regression
step. For each observation (county c in year t), I conduct a match against all other
counties so that the weighted average is observably similar on data prior to t. The
resulting weight vector wct is constrained to be non-negative and sum to one. This
6The classic SCM requires that donors not be affected by the treatment variable. This is equivalent
to saying that the εit are independent and that xct ⊥ εct conditional on the interactive fixed effects.
7Since lct = ρlc,t−1 + εct can be re-written as lct = ρtlc,0 + νct where νct is AR(1).
8For ease of exposition, the estimate of interest is not time-varying though this is relaxed later.
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weighted average serves as an observation’s counterfactual. It has a complete history,
which is similar on observables to the evaluation county c prior to the evaluation year
t but may differ from t onward. In effect, the counterfactual is estimating what one










xt be the N × (t− 1) matrices that contain the prior data for all counties.











xct ∀c, t. (1.2)
In cases where multiple weight vectors can match the histories exactly, I resolve
the indeterminacy by choosing the vector that distributes the weight the most (by
minimizing the Euclidean distance ‖wct‖). This is a change to the existing SCM
matching procedure that makes the process smooth in large samples.9
Then I construct for every observation (c, t), the contemporary difference between
it and its counterfactual, ∆lct = lct−w′ctlt and ∆xct = xct−w′ctxt. A regression using
the observable differences is then
∆lct = β∆xct + εct ∀c, t
9When a complete match is not possible, I follow the SCM and (a) determine a set of vari-
able weights V from regressions of the outcomes on predictors variables (Z), then (b) wct =
argminw ‖Zct −w′Zt‖V .
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One can show that εct = ∆εct −Λt∆
↼










is invertible10. The composite error has two parts, (a) ∆εct shows that the synthetic
counterfactual may differ from the evaluation county in the current year even given a
perfect match, and (b) Λt∆
↼
εct is from incorrectly matching due to historical errors. In
Appendix 1.7, I show that the estimator of β is consistent and asymptotically normal
for fixed T as N →∞.11
In finite sample, not all counties will be able to be matched exactly for pre-
evaluation data. Similar to the classic SC methodology (and analogously to how GLS
optimally downweights observations by their variance) I downweight observations
by their pre-evaluation mean-squared-prediction-error (MSPE). The match quality
increases with the length of historical data so it is standard to set aside an initial T0
years to be used exclusively for matching.
To see the intuition for the extension to a panel setting, note that if one matched
on the entire history of the independent and dependent variables then there would be
no difference to use in estimation. Additionally, a counterfactual becomes less accurate
the farther into the future it is projected. For these two reasons, in a panel setting,
multiple matches are made for every county, each time with progressively more recent
data used. Changes in the year after matching are what is used in the regression.
In the match step, one can place extra constraints on the weight vector. In
my setting where I am concerned about spill-overs between counties, I constrain the
weight vector to have zero elements for all counties in the same MSA. Without this,
10This imposes F ≤ t− 1 by the Cauchy-Binet formula.
11It is assumed that β is constant (homogeneous treatment effects). The case of non-constant β
(heterogeneous treatment effects) remains to be explored.
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they may receive high weights given they are likely similar on observables. Spillovers
between MSAs are likely to be much smaller. Compared to the high number of workers
that work elsewhere in the same MSA, the median share of workers from a county
that work in any other MSA is only 4.0%.
As an example of the process for a county, assume that counties A and B are
in an MSA. Examining county A in year t, a weighted average of other counties A′
is found (from those not including B) such that A and A′ are similar on observables
from the initial year to t− 1. Intuitively, given that the match is on both dependent
and independent variables it will end being very similar in terms of the unobservables
which will then match µA. For year t, a shock may occur for county A and the
constituent counties of A′. Given however that A′ is likely composed of many counties
and I assume that their shocks are independent, then the weighted average of those
shocks will be small.
Similar to the classic SCM model, one can estimate delayed effects of current




β−lxc,t−l + λtµc + εct ∀c, t





βl∆xc,t+l + εct ∀c, t
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so that shocks to covariates in year t can be related to outcomes in year t+ l.
One advantage of generalizing the exogenous variable x beyond a binary treat-
ment that it was in SCM is that other time-changing regressors can be included. This
can improve identification and reduce variation. For example, classic SCM identifies
an effect that differentially causes a change in one unit at a particular time. The
modeler makes the case that she knows what policy or change happened at this time
to attribute the effect to. In reality many variables are changing and it is impossible
to distinguish them in SCM. In this synthetic regression one can control for other
multiple time-changing variables.
1.3.1.2 Inference
I use the wild bootstrap for inference as it has been shown to be valid under similar
conditions. First, it is used with factor-augmented regressions (Gonçalves and Perron,
2014). Second, though asymptotically smooth, the synthetic regression estimator is
non-smooth in finite sample (see Appendix 1.7.1). For a similar non-smoothness in
k-nearest neighbors matching (which does not become smooth asymptotically) the
naive bootstrap is inconsistent (Abadie and Imbens, 2008) whereas the wild bootstrap
is consistent (Otsu and Rai, 2015). I also provide Monte-Carlo evidence that this
produces valid inference in Section 1.8.
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The wild bootstrap takes as given the initial estimations including matches.
Specifically, given an initial estimates
∆lct = β̂∆xct + ε̂ct ∀c, t
It then repeatedly modifies the sample by transforming the final residuals and then
re-estimating the model. Specifically, it conducts B repetitions to construct the
distribution {β̂b}, where in repetition b, the procedure:
1. Draws {vbct} for all (c, t) from a resampling distribution. Following Otsu and


















2. Constructs {∆ybct} for all (c, t) from ∆ybct = β̂∆xct + vbctε̂ct.
3. Regresses ∆yb on ∆x yielding estimated β̂b.
With the distribution {β̂b}, I conduct inference.
1.3.2 Estimation
Following KM, I divide manufacturing into 21 subsectors and let the elasticity
vary by the electricity intensity of the subsector. I also condition on ozone pollution and
environmental regulation measures as they could be correlated with electricity prices
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and employment. Ozone is a by product of burning fossil fuels, and if certain indicators
of it become too high then the EPA deems the county as ozone “non-attainment” for
that year. All ozone emitters in such a county are subject to extra regulatory oversight.
This regulation may affect both electricity prices and employment and is therefore
included as a control.
Matching variables are picked to expand upon those from KM. For time-changing
predictors, I include historical trends since 199012 in sectoral employment, energy
prices, and EPA county nonattainment status. Fixed characteristics are also included,
such as 1970 population, geographic size, distance to central business district, and 1990
house value. To remove the possibility of local spillovers and interference I disallow
counties from the same MSA to be in each other’s synthetic counterfactual. Matches
are also only made within the same subsector.
I then construct the observation-counterfactual differences and estimate an
equation similar to KM for 1998-2009:
∆lctk =β1∆pct + β2∆pct · ElecIndexkt + β3ElecIndexkt+
β4∆Nonattainct + β5∆Nonattainct · PollIndexk + β6PollIndexk+
f(∆Pollct) + εctk (1.3)
where lctk is employment for county c in year t in subsector k, p is log electricity prices,
ElecIndexkt is an index of sectoral electricity intensity constructed as electricity costs
12Following Dube and Zipperer (2015) who determine optimal SCM predictor sets for using cross-
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as a proportion of sales, Nonattainct is whether the EPA designated this county as a
Nonattainment county for ozone pollution, PollIndexk is an index of sectoral ozone
pollution intensity constructed as total emissions over value added, f(Pollct) is a
cubic polynomial of average ozone concentrations to account for potential regulatory
differences away from the non-attainment cutoff.
As a robustness exercise I instrument for the possibility of measurement error or
reverse causality, which could be due to demand-side changes or bargaining power of
manufacturing firms. Similar to Kahn and Mansur (2013), I instrument pct with a
shift-share IV13 in the regression step. Each county’s electricity fuel type (coal, oil,
gas) capacity shares in 1995 are interacted that with the time-series of national prices
of those three fuels. This is a valid instrument assuming that initial characteristics are
not associated with future unobservables. As it is likely that location characteristics
(µc) affect both, then it is essential to control for, as I do, the unobserved factors
before using the instrument.
1.3.3 Data
My measure of electricity price is the Energy Information Administration data
on average yearly utility rates from Form EIA-861 for 1990-2009. This data also
includes the counties of operation for each utility. When multiple utilities operate
in the same county I compute as a price the average weighted by total utility size.
validation, I include as match variables every other value of time-changing variables. This type of
cross-validation is not possible in my setting as all counties can experience changes in electricity prices.
13This is also known as a Bartik instrument for Bartik (1991)
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Manufacturing plants that receive electricity from a source other than their local
utility will not be captured in this measure of prices. These establishments will include
those that have their own generation or that purchase electricity independently and
have it transmitted through their local utility. This latter is more likely for large
establishments in states that have a large percentage of independent power producers.
Additionally, this price measure is an average and actual rate scheme may be more
complicated including different rates for peak-time consumption.
Retail utility electricity prices are usually set by public-utility commissions
(PUC), often at the state-level. They approve rates based on average cost pricing.14
Roughly, this equates to total expenses (e.g., fuel and energy purchases) plus an
allowed rate of return on existing assets. PUCs approve major infrastructure changes,
large changes to sales areas, mergers and splits, and influence the rates of return. For
these reasons it is possible that municipal or state regulatory bodies may take into
account, directly or indirectly, local employment when deciding on rates, which is why
controlling for unobserved characteristics is important. Negotiations with PUCs can
take years so rate plans are often in place for several years. Differences between a
county and its synthetic counterfactual in terms of prices can be thought of then as
forecast errors that arise from the multi-year plans.
For industrial employment data I use the US Census County Business Patterns
(CBP) data from 1990-2009 which has yearly, county employment (total mid-March
14Rates may also be based on incentivizing other goals, such as energy efficiency, reliability, or
transmission capacity. Nuclear plants and earlier contracts made because of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978 caused much of the regional variation in prices earlier in the
sample period. Regions that restructured their utilities went through a phase where utilities could
recover “stranded” costs and now prices are mostly set by by regional whole-sale costs. See Joskow et
al. (1989) and Joskow (2006) for further details.
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employees) by detailed industry from firms. Following KM I aggregate the CBP to the
three-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level leaving 21 in-
dustry categories. Prior to 1998, the CBP used Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes and so I use the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) SIC-NAICS
concordance to translate older categories. Though there may be some measurement
error in this conversion, these data are only used for matching purposes. For privacy
considerations many observations with few establishments have their employment
counts suppressed in the CBP. Data on the number of establishments in various size
classes is always available. Following KM, I therefore impute the suppressed values
using size-class midpoints.15 The imputed observations have mostly lower levels of
employment. The median censored observation has 59 imputed employees while the
median uncensored observation has 1708 employees.
The NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database provides data on factors,
including energy and expenditures. It also includes data on value added and sales.
The index of electricity intensity is standardized to a zero to one scale.
The EPA provides sectoral emission levels from the 2002 National Emissions
Inventory database.16 These are standardized to a zero to one scale. Data on yearly
county nonattainment status is from the EPA’s Green Book. The nonattainment
standard is measure of the number of days that have ozone concentrations peak above
15Size class are: 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000-1499, 1500-2499,
2500-4999, and 5000 or more. For imputation purposes, those in the 5000 or more category are
classified as having 6000 employees.
16For ozone, I aggregate tons of nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev.
Manufacturing employees 534.0 1996.2
Has manufacturing 0.777 0.416
Electricity price (USD/kWh) 0.0724 0.0202
Ozone monitor in county 0.480 0.500
Ozone (ppm, mean of 8hr) 0.0221 0.0234
Ozone nonattainment (8hr) 0.146 0.353
Notes: Observations are by county (1158 counties in 380 MSAs),
year (1998-2009), and 3-digit NAICS sector (21 total). 270444
total observations.
a threshold.17 Average ozone levels are from the EPA Aerometric Information Retrieval
System (AIRS) database.
Summary statistics for the main variables are shown in Table 1.1.
1.4 Results
I begin with re-estimating the main models of Kahn and Mansur (2013) as
they are the current state of the art. I then show how my estimation strategy yields
different estimates for the same contemporaneous price channel, but slightly stronger
effects for more permanent perceived price increases.
17From 1979-1997, county ozone nonattainment was defined as at least two days per calendar
year with maximum hourly average concentration greater than 0.12 ppm. For 1998-2008, county
nonattainment was when the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hr concentration, averaged
over 3 years was over 0.08 ppm. In 2008 this threshold was changed to 0.075 ppm.
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1.4.1 Border-Pair Results
I first present re-estimations of the KMmain findings in Table 1.2. The estimation
equation is
lc,j(c),tk =β1pct + β2pct · ElecIndexkt + β3ElecIndexkt+
β4Nonattainct + β5Nonattainct · PollIndexk + β7PollIndexk+
β8Rightss(c) + β9Rightss(c) · LabCapRatiokt + β10LabCapRatiokt+
β11NoMonc + β12NoMonc · PollIndexk+
δZc + f(Pollutionct) + φj(c) + φs(c),t + φkt + εc,j(c),tk (1.4)
where j(c) indexes the county pairs that contain MSA county c, t indexes years
(1998-2009), k is the subsector, Rightss(c) denotes whether the state that c is located
in is a “Right to Work” state meaning that it prohibits company-union contracts
that bar non-union employees, LabCapRatiokt is sectoral labor to capital ratio (in
hours worked per value of capital stock), NoMonc indicates whether the county lacks
an ozone monitoring station, φ are various fixed effects, and Zc are county fixed
characteristics:population in 1970, miles to central business district, land area, and
1990 housing values.
The main finding of KM is that energy-intensive subsectors experience large
employment changes due price change18. Their estimated elasticities for sectors with
the highest electricity intensity are around -1.6. This is evident in my re-estimation
18Their results for low energy-intensive sectors are small effect, sometimes negative but often
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Table 1.2: Re-estimation of Kahn & Mansur Findings
(1) (2) (3)
N N ln N






















R2 0.368 0.365 0.467
Observations 969168 969168 783184
Notes: Outcome variable is yearly county employment in manufactur-
ing subsectors (mean=534). Sample is MSA counties from 1998-2009.
All regressions include population in 1970, miles to central busi-
ness district, land area, 1990 housing values, cubic polynomials of
ozone concentractions, county-pair, industry-year, and state-year
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the utility level. ∗ p < .1,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
22
as well as can be seen in the coefficient on energy prices interacted with the electricity
intensity index. The finding is quite robust across the specifications.
There are several differences between my study and that of KM. Equation 1.4
has two main differences from Equation 1.3. First, given its scope is about broader
geographic comparative advantage, it includes variables related to union power and
presence of pollution monitoring stations. Second, its level of fixed effects is more
coarse. Other county border-pair designs, such as Dube et al. (2010), include multiple
fixed effects for each pair (e.g., φc + φj(c),t) which algebraically leads to a difference
equation similar to Equation 1.3. Additionally, weighting used by KM is different
than some other county border-pairs designs, though the mapping to my design is not
exact. KM downweight each observation from a county by the number of pairs that
include the county (others weight each border the same). In Table 1.3, I re-estimate
the model, changing these characteristics to show that the main result holds. Column
1 is repeated from Table 1.2. The rest of the columns omit variables dealing with
union power or presence of pollution monitoring stations. Columns 3 and 4 use the
more fine-grained fixed effects. Column 4 weights each border, rather than each
county, the same. Across the entire table the coefficient on the interaction of energy
prices and sectoral energy intensity is negative, large, and significant. In some of the
specifications, the coefficient on log electricity prices is positive indicating that in
sectors with the lowest electricity intensity the cross-price elasticity is positive.
positive.
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Table 1.3: Border-Pair Sensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N N N N
ln Electricity price -41.60 -41.58 183.7∗ 274.5∗∗
(88.14) (87.56) (98.17) (137.5)
ln Price ∗
electricity index
-1140.7∗∗ -1266.0∗∗ -1041.5∗∗ -1249.9∗∗
(544.2) (582.6) (509.3) (545.4)




Nonattainment county -5.015 34.42 20.52 -2.077
(24.14) (27.47) (29.81) (31.29)
Nonattainment ∗
pollution index
-421.0∗∗∗ -647.6∗∗∗ -446.4∗∗∗ -383.6∗∗∗
(123.0) (163.5) (123.7) (115.3)






R2 0.368 0.366 0.360 0.353
FE type coarse coarse fine fine
Weighting border county county border
Observations 969168 969168 969168 969168
Notes: Outcome variable is yearly county employment in manufacturing subsectors
(mean=534). Sample is MSA counties from 1998-2009. All regressions include cubic
polynomials of ozone concentration. Regressions without county FEs also include
population in 1970, miles to central business district, land area and 1990 housing
values. Standard errors clustered at the utility level. Weight-type county=counties
have same total weight. Weight-type border=county comparisons (borders) have
same weight. FE-type coarse=county-pair industry#year state#year, fine=county
county-pair#year. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 1.4: Base Synthetic Regression Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lt Lt+1 Lt+2 Lt+3
LnEnergy Price -0.179 15.80∗∗∗ 41.22∗∗∗ 19.81
[-0.713, 0.330] [8.521, 24.66] [14.25, 65.69] [0.641, 38.35]
ln Price * 34.63 58.75 164.0 123.1
electricity ind. [-8.645, 95.37] [-79.04, 244.6] [-165.5, 543.8] [-198.5, 442.6]
Nonattainment 1.165 3.274 6.466 5.237
county [-0.405, 2.829] [-0.898, 7.690] [-2.423, 15.33] [-2.428, 13.20]
Nonattain. * -2.846 0.524 20.91 13.62
pollution ind. [-13.06, 5.030] [-9.915, 10.66] [-15.97, 61.69] [-8.181, 42.47]
N 269356 246909 224462 202015
Notes: Outcome variable is yearly county employment in manufacturing subsectors (mean=534).
Sample is MSA counties from 1998-2009. Regressions use the difference between an observation and
its synthetic counterfactual (weighted average of other counties which in aggregate has observably
similar histories of the outcome and regressors). Regressions include cubic polynomial of county
Ozone concentration. Columns to the right indicate estimated delayed effects on employment from
initial price shocks. 95% CIs in brackets (from 399 bootstraps). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
1.4.2 Base Synthetic Regression Result
Now I estimate the same equation but pairing a county with its synthetic
counterfactual instead of its neighboring county. Column 1 of Table 1.4 contains
synthetic regression results from estimating my main specification, Equation 1.3. The
later columns show delayed effects from shocks. I find that the effect of energy prices
on employment are insignificant and bounded much closer to zero than that of KM.
Some delayed effects are significant but quite small.
The sectors may have significant effects that are not correlated by electricity
intensity. Table 1.5 shows estimates for when the model is run separately by sector.
The results remain insignificant and bounded close to zero except for one of the 21
sectors.
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Table 1.5: Sectoral Results
Sector Electricity Point 95% CI
index estimate
Primary metal manufacturing (mnfct) 1.000 -12.46 [-29.89, 4.97]
Paper mnfct 0.856 -2.32 [-5.78, 1.15]
Textile mills 0.591 -1.07 [-4.58, 2.44]
Nonmetallic mineral product mnfct 0.527 -17.14∗∗ [-31.19, -3.1]
Chemical mnfct 0.459 1.94 [-15.63, 19.51]
Plastics and rubber products mnfct 0.364 6.74 [-2.21, 15.7]
Wood product mnfct 0.265 3.8 [-2.49, 10.09]
Petroleum and coal products mnfct 0.254 28.7 [-6.01, 63.42]
Fabricated metal product mnfct 0.175 3.09 [-5.96, 12.14]
Printing and related support activities 0.154 2.33 [-6.69, 11.35]
Textile product mills 0.149 -16.71 [-40.01, 6.59]
Food mnfct 0.128 -8.07 [-27.75, 11.62]
Elec. equip., appl., and comp. mnfct 0.112 3.81 [-2.7, 10.32]
Furniture and related product mnfct 0.094 0.69 [-2.27, 3.66]
Leather and allied product mnfct 0.077 -0.29 [-1.15, 0.57]
Machinery mnfct 0.068 -2.64 [-21.41, 16.13]
Apparel mnfct 0.067 1.18 [-1.85, 4.22]
Miscellaneous mnfct 0.059 -8.4 [-26.07, 9.27]
Beverage and tobacco product mnfct 0.053 3.13 [-2.68, 8.94]
Transportation equipment mnfct 0.045 3.55 [-18.05, 25.16]
Computer and electronic product mnfct 0.000 -2.28 [-5.41, 0.85]
Notes: Coefficients from separate sector-level regressions of yearly county employment in manu-
facturing subsectors (mean=534) on county log electricity prices. Sample is MSA counties from
1998-2009. Regressions uses the difference between an observation and its synthetic counterfactual
(weighted average of other counties which in aggregate has observably similar histories of the
outcome and regressors). Controls include county non-attainments status and a cubic in average
county ozone pollution. Inference from 399 bootstraps. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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1.4.2.1 Robustness
In Table 1.6 I show that these null results are stable after instrumenting with
the shift-share measure. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments is quite strong.
Results in column 1 again point to insignificant effects of energy prices.
The national employment trend of manufacturing from 1998-2009 was quite
varied, with some years experiencing large overall losses and other years experiencing
only small losses. To see if insignificant local results are due to heterogeneity by this
national pattern I separately estimate the effect on split samples. The years with
small losses (1998-2000 and 2004-2007) experienced an average yearly decline of 134
thousand jobs, while the years with large losses (2001-2003 and 2008-2009) experienced
an average yearly decline of 919 thousand jobs. Table 1.7 shows the estimates on
contemporaneous employment for these two time periods. The results are similar to
those from the whole sample. During years with small national declines there is a
small significant positive base effect of price increases but no effect for an industry
being more energy-intensive. During years with large national declines there is no
significant relationship between local price increases and employment.
1.4.2.2 Source of Discrepancy
To isolate which factor drives the difference between my estimates and those
of KM, I estimate an intermediate model that is similar to KM in terms of match
19Synthetic regression results are by allowing any county to form a counterfactual (including those
in the same MSA). This is because, although counties in the same MSA receive a weight that is
higher than average, it is small in absolute terms. For this reason, these models still differ from the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Results by National Manufacturing Employment Trend
(1) (2)
Employment Employment
Ln Energy Price 28.80∗∗ 0.582
[8.593, 50.47] [-0.663, 1.527]
ln Price * electricity index 125.1 -1.854
[-131.7, 422.3] [-24.39, 18.28]
Nonattainment county -6.920∗∗ 5.120∗
[-11.94, -2.523] [-0.455, 9.365]
Nonattainment * pollution index 42.00 2.988
[-25.77, 108.1] [-28.40, 29.75]
National Man Emp Loss Small Large
N 157751 112684
Notes: Outcome variable is yearly MSA-county employment in manufacturing
subsectors (mean=534). Sample periods split by size of yearly decline in national
manufacturing: Small declines (1998-2000 and 2004-2007) and large declines (2001-
2003 and 2008-2009). Regressions use the difference between an observation and its
synthetic counterfactual (weighted average of other counties which in aggregate
has observably similar histories of the outcome and regressors). Regressions
include cubic polynomial of county Ozone concentration. Columns to the right
indicate estimated delayed effects on employment from initial price shocks. 95%
CIs in brackets (from 299 bootstraps). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
quality but that prevents spill-overs as in my base estimation.19 To do this, note that
for a given evaluation county, the synthetic counterfactual of its neighbor will not be
contaminated by spill-overs from the evaluation county but will be at least as bad of a
match to the evaluation county as the neighbor. Table 1.8 column 3 shows estimates
of this “cross” model, which is estimated similar to the KM border-pair strategy but
where counties are paired with the synthetic controls of their neighbors rather than
the neighbors themselves. The estimate on the interaction term between price and
electricity index of the cross model is similar to that of KM and indeed is contained
within the 95% confidence interval of the KM estimate. This suggests that what drives
the difference between my main estimates and those of KM is that neighbors serve as
poor counterfactuals. Modeled as in Griliches (1979), this implies that the MSA share
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Table 1.8: Source of Bias
KM Main Cross
Lt Lt Lt
Ln Energy Price -41.60 -0.179 1018.8∗∗
[131.2, -214.4] [-0.713, 0.330] [939.9, 1075.9]
ln Price * electricity index -1140.7∗∗ 34.63 -2064.1∗∗
[-74.07, -2207] [-8.645, 95.37] [-2235.1, -1860.1]
Nonattainment county -5.015 1.165 407.4∗∗
[42.30, -52.33] [-0.405, 2.829] [384.8, 429.8]
Nonattainment * pollution index -421.0∗∗ -2.846 -534.9∗∗
[-180.0, -662.1] [-13.06, 5.030] [-582.2, -494.6]
N 969168 269356 919817
N otes: Dependent variable is county-sector-employment (mean=534). KM regression is a border pair
design. SR is a synthetic regression. Cross is a border pair design where a county is matched to the
synthetic control of its neighbor. Regressions include cubic polynomial of county Ozone concentration.
95% CIs in brackets (from 299 bootstraps). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
of the variance in the endogenous component of prices is less than in the exogenous
component of prices.
1.4.3 Perceived Permanent Shocks
The fact that transitory, yearly shocks have little effect on employment may not
be surprising. Decisions about the opening or closing of establishments and about
staffing are likely done over a long time horizon in manufacturing. I therefore check
for effects from perceived permanent price changes.
First, I examine the effect of large and persistent shocks to electricity prices.
Following Ajzenman et al. (forthcoming), I identify “persistent” shocks that satisfy
two criteria: i) for three years the price is consistently higher (lower) than expected,
compared to its counterfactual, and ii) the three year difference from what was expected
is in the top 10% of all such differences. This includes 9.2% of the county-sector-year
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observations. 28.0% of the county-sectors have at least one persistent shock during
their history.
I estimate a modification of Equation 1.3 that includes interactions with the
persistent shock dummy variable (those on the third line).
∆lctk =β1∆pct + β2∆pct · ElecIndexkt + β3ElecIndexkt+
β4∆Nonattainct + β5∆Nonattainct · PollIndexk + β6PollIndexk+
β7PersShockct + β8PersShockct ·∆pct + β9PersShockct ·∆pct · ElecIndkt+
f(∆Pollct) + εctk (1.5)
Results are shown in Table 1.9. One sees that now there is a significant negative
effect for persistent shocks to energy intensive sectors. The point estimate stays
negative for three years, but becomes insignificant. The estimate for the main effect
from energy prices on energy intensity is now positive and significant. This implies
that there is a small positive effect from transitory shocks, but, compared to those,
the effect of a perceived permanent shock is more negative.
Another signal that prices may change more permanently is the expectation
about future electricity prices. As direct county-level data for this does not exist, I
construct a measure using existing national-level expectations for future fuel prices
interacted with the initial fuel-capacity shares of each county’s generation capabilities.
The expectations are from the price of fuel futures contracts with delivery dates three
20I use the yearly average of prices of futures contracts traded on the CME NYMEX exchange. For
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Table 1.9: Effects of Persistent Shocks
(1) (2) (3)
Lt Lt+1 Lt+2
Ln Energy Price -0.415 2.732∗∗ 9.563∗∗
[-1.292, 0.361] [0.664, 5.410] [0.543, 23.54]
ln Price * electricity index 33.98∗ 19.60 61.46
[1.016, 77.75] [-10.76, 63.94] [-80.16, 278.8]
Persistent shock -0.440 -0.437∗ -1.225
[-1.112, 0.0398] [-0.848, -0.0377] [-3.165, 0.167]
Persistent * ln Price -0.252 -3.007∗∗ -10.27
[-1.844, 0.975] [-5.705, -0.841] [-24.85, -0.836]
Persistent * ln Price
* electricity index
-42.41∗ -7.724 -30.79
[-90.73, -4.226] [-57.55, 31.88] [-262.0, 126.3]
N 202022 202022 202022
Notes: Outcome variable is yearly county employment in manufacturing subsectors (mean=534).
Sample is MSA counties from 1998-2009. Regressions use the difference between an observation
and its synthetic counterfactual (weighted average of other counties which in aggregate has
observably similar histories of the outcome and regressors). Regressions includes controls for
Nonattainment county status and a cubic polynomial of county Ozone concentration. Columns
to the right indicate estimated delayed effects on employment from initial price shocks. 95%
confidence intervals in brackets (from 399 bootstraps). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
years in the future.20 I use as expectations the price of the contract three years before
expiration, or the closest month to that given the data. This data exists for the three
fuels from 2001-2009.
In Table 1.10 I estimate a model with future price measures. I find significant
negative results for one-year and two-years after a change in electricity price expecta-
tions. The size of these estimated elasticities is still quite small, with the two-year
effect corresponding to an elasticity of -0.05.
oil I use the CL contract (CME code) for light sweet crude. For natural gas I use the NG contract
for natural gas traded at the Henry Hub in Louisiana. For coal I use the QL contract for Central
Appalachian Coal.
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Table 1.10: Effect of Futures Prices
(1) (2) (3)
Lt Lt+1 Lt+2
Ln Energy Price 1.179 5.951∗∗ 10.10
[-1.317, 3.522] [1.166, 11.12] [-1.788, 23.49]
ln Price * electricity index -20.35 45.30 -117.9
[-63.36, 13.23] [-64.27, 187.4] [-263.1, 55.83]
Ln Future Energy Price -0.145 -0.709 -0.225
[-0.584, 0.248] [-1.602, -0.00908] [-1.753, 1.430]
Ln Future Energy Price * 1.617 -24.28∗∗∗ -30.29∗∗∗
electricity index [-1.153, 5.195] [-35.80, -13.64] [-42.81, -20.70]
N 182418 182417 182417
Notes: Outcome variable is yearly county employment in manufacturing subsectors (mean=534).
Sample is MSA counties from 1998-2009. Regressions use the difference between an observation
and its synthetic counterfactual (weighted average of other counties which in aggregate has
observably similar histories of the outcome and regressors). Regressions includes controls for
Nonattainment county status and a cubic polynomial of county Ozone concentration. Columns
to the right indicate estimated delayed effects on employment from initial price shocks. 95%
confidence intervals in brackets (from 299 bootstraps). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
1.5 Discussion
In this section I discuss the implications of my estimated elasticities for predicting
effects of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan. I then discuss possible future uses of this
estimation strategy.
1.5.1 Effects of CPP
The CPP is the largest US climate change policy. It sets state-by-state limits
for CO2 emissions for the power generation sector to be achieved by 2022 and 2030.
Each limit was calculated by devising a federal plan that applies existing solutions for
reducing carbon to a state’s fleet of generators. States are free, however, to implement
21The EPA does not attempt to take into account employment effects in non-energy-producing
sectors, though it is beginning such a process by convening a panel of experts to examine at this issue.
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their own policies to meet their state-level limits. The Environmental Protection
Agency’s Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA, 2014b) forecasts that the CPP will affect
energy prices non-uniformly by up to 6%.21
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan provides two compliance options for states, a
rate-based cap based on the tons of CO2 that are emitted per MWh of electricity, or a
mass-based cap based on total tons of CO2 emitted. Table 1.12 shows the Regulatory
Impact Assessment predictions for the increase in retail electricity prices based on
these two choices for 2020. Employment effects estimated here are based on the
rate-based caps, though they are similar for the mass-based caps given the retail price
increases are quite similar. Retail price changes are predicted based on EPA Electricity
Market Module Regions.22 These are shown in Figure 1.1. Currently, due to lack of
data to establish baselines, the Clean Power Plan only applies to the contiguous US.23
The EMM regions are not geographically defined but are defined by energy
company membership. I translate counties to EMM regions in several steps. First,
some states lie completely within a region. Second, Form EIA-861 data connects
utilities to Balancing Authorities which can usually be unambiguously mapped to
regions using the Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID)
2012 data. The remaining counties are assigned to the region that had the most
generating capacity in the county’s state as noted by the eGRID 2012 data.
Given the estimated price increase at the county level, I compute the expected
effect on manufacturing given each county’s subsectoral employment and the estimated
22Equivalent to the EPA Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database subregion.
23Additionally, as Vermont and Washington D.C. do not have any fossil-fuel electricity generating
units, they are not they are not covered directly by the plan.
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Figure 1.1: EPA eGRID Subregions
Source: (EPA, 2014a)
sectoral elasticity. Using the subsectoral elasticities of KM,24 one would predict a loss
of 84,000 jobs (.9% of total manufacturing). The elasticity they estimate is one that
is based on contemporaneous prices whereas the policy change is a predicted future
change, so this is likely an upper bound. Using the most negative elasticities from my
specifications (from the futures prices regressions), I estimate a loss of only 4,100 jobs
(.045%). Given my elasticity is estimated from changes to future price expectations,
these would be delayed effects happening around two years after the change.
The elasticities estimated are from local-level changes in electricity prices and
therefore estimate the extent of local variation in effects and not a national effect. The
CPP will affect prices nationally but given my low estimates one would not expect
concentrated effects. The predicted local effects are likely to be upper bounds given
24Elasticities are from KM Table 3 column 1.
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that most other locations will also experience an increase in prices and therefore there
will be less re-allocation.
1.5.2 Other Border-Pair Studies
While I have applied my identification strategy to electricity prices and manu-
facturing employment it has broader applications to research that has utilized panel
border-pair methodologies. These designs have been used in the study of manufactur-
ing employment since Holmes (1998), in the minimum-wage literature since Dube et
al. (2010), finance since Huang (2008), and have been introduced into the economics
of education (Naidu, 2012; Dhar and Ross, 2012), armed conflict (Arias et al., 2014)
and development (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
In these settings, one may wish to use the synthetic regression for several reason.
First, it may reduce bias in situations with spillovers between units or inadequate
matches. Second, as this approach attempts to control for a slightly different class of
unobservables it can serve as a methodological robustness check or as a substitute if
the econometrician has some outside knowledge of possible confounders.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the effect of local electricity prices on local man-
ufacturing employment. Recent best estimates of this elasticity may be biased by
dependence between neighboring counties in the same labor market and inadequate
match quality. To deal with these potential problems I develope a novel estimation
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strategy and provide conditions for its consistency. Applying this methodology I
find that the estimated effects of contemporaneous price shocks on contemporaneous
employment are in general insignificant.
Given that manufacturing likely faces adjustments costs for their factor inputs,
I estimate effects from perceived permanent price changes and for delayed effects.
I find effects that are significant and negative for large and persistent shocks and
from changes in the expectation of future electricity prices. Economically, though,
the estimated elasticities are small, ranging from 0 to -0.05 for the most electricity
intensive subsector. These magnitudes are similar to the earlier historical studies of
this elasticity. Though firms do not appear to meaningfully change employment levels,
they may adjust along other margins, such as hours, wages, or capital investment.
Given these sectoral elasticities, the predicted effects of the EPA’s Clean Power
Plan on employment are drastically reduced from current best estimates. Though the
Clean Power Plan is predicted to raise electricity rates by up to 6%, in a non-uniform
way across the US, I find that predicted differential effect across the US is on the order
of several thousand jobs, smaller than typical monthly variation in manufacturing
employment.
Finally, the identification strategy used in this paper may help others in a
panel setting. It provides identification with weaker assumptions than the standard
panel model by controlling for unobserved factors. It can be an alternative to border-
pair designs, especially when one is concerned about interference between units or
non-parallel trends.
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1.7 Appendix A: Theoretical Properties of the Estimator
In this section I detail the theoretical properties of my estimator. I first note
the need for a modification to the matching procedure. Then, I move to proving the
consistency and asymptotic normality.
1.7.1 Smoothness of Matching Procedure
The smoothness by which small changes to the data have predictably small
effects on the estimate is a property that is important for both consistency and valid
inference in large samples. The matching procedure may not be smooth in finite
sample, though, with a modification it will be in large samples.25
In finite sample, the predictors of an evaluation units may not be in the convex
hull of other units and therefore will not have a synthetic counterfactual that exactly
reproduces its characteristics. This is more likely given I match on multiple variables
over many years. Perturbing the data of another unit may change the convex hull
causing different units to be used for a match. This can cause a large corresponding
difference in average outcome.26 For this reason it is important to use the wild
bootstrap as it has been shown to be robust to the same type of non-smoothness in
similar matching estimators (Otsu and Rai, 2015).
When a unit is in the convex hull and there are more non-colinear units than the
dimension of the matching vector (as in the large-sample case) there is an indeterminacy
25It should be noted that Abadie et al. (2010) show consistency as T0 →∞ where I rely on N →∞.
26Note that the inability to match exactly can be avoided if we allow negative weights and have at
least as many (non-colinear) units as predictor variables. This is disallowed in Abadie et al. (2010)
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in picking the weight vector as infinitely many will match exactly. Abadie et al. (2010)
do not resolve the indeterminacy in their paper and therefore do not guarantee
asymptotic smoothness.27 Asymptotic smoothness is important for determining the
asymptotic distribution of the estimator. I therefore extend the matching procedure
to resolve the indeterminacy in a smooth manner.
I make a modification the algorithm to find weights wi that are the most
distributed when possible. Let xi contain the match variables of unit i, and X
the (k ×N) matrix for all units. Then, when legal weights can be found such that




1N ≥ wi ≥ 0N
w′i · 1N = 1
Xwi = xi
As is shown in Theorem 1 this causes weights for all units to approach zero. As
more units are generated, the disparity between donors with high and low weights is
diminished.28
as it forces the researcher to evaluate whether matches are appropriate given that estimates using
data far from the convex hull are likely to be less valid.
27Their programmed estimators appears to not guarantee smoothness when picking the weights.
28Another possible way to resolve the indeterminacy would be to pick weights so that units receiving
large weight are as similar as possible to the evaluation unit. To do so, first construct a distance
measure for the similarity of two units d(xi,xj) such as d(xi,xj ;V ) =
∑
k[(xik−xjk)/xik]2vk (where
V denotes the vector of predictor weights). Define d(xi) as the vector with jth element d(xi,xj).
Then, if weights can be found such that Xwi = xi, we can change the objective function of Equation
1.6 to minwi w′id(xi), keeping the same constraints.
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With zero matching variables, the weights become uniform and constant across
observations so that the procedure results in OLS (or GLS if down-weighting by the
mean square predicted error).
1.7.2 Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Averages
Theorem 1. Suppose that {wni : n ≥ 1, n ≥ i ≥ 1} is a double sequence of real
non-negative numbers from the optimization problem of Equation 1.6. Then for {Xi}


















ni. The standard case is when wni = n−1 and then γn = n−1. By
Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pr
(∣∣∣X̃n − µ∣∣∣ < ε) ≥ 1− σ2
ε2
γn
This would both limit interpolation bias and give more intuition for the weights (concentrating
weight to fewer units) so it is more in the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010). However, since evaluation
units will be matched with positive weight to other units, this procedure it also not asymptotically
smooth. If such an estimator was consistent it would likely rely on T0 →∞ (similar to the classic
SCM) which is less convincing in my setting given the length of my panel.
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Conveniently, this is minimization problem in Equation 1.6. First, note that with the
generation of new data points, the optimization problem will only transfer weight from
units that had more weight to those that had less (the transfer is linear in weights
and it is minimizing the quadratic). This implies that if κn = arg maxj wnj then
wnκn ≥ wmκn for m > n. Indeed, ∃m > n such wnκn > wmκn . In the most degenerate
case, eventually the DGP will produce additional points that encompass unit κn
in their convex hull, at which point wκn must diminish. By similar arguments, the
maximum weight will eventually fall below any fixed threshold ω ∈ (0, 1). This implies
that the maximum of all weights approaches zero, limn→∞wnκn → 0. Therefore, for
all j, limn→∞wnj → 0.
1.7.3 Panel Setup





















































































Let ỹ be the stacked ∆yit observations and similarly for x̃, r̃1, r̃2. Then estimat-
ing
ỹ = βx̃+ ε̃
yields
β̂ = (x̃′x̃)−1x̃′ỹ
= β0 + (x̃
′x̃)−1x̃′(r̃1 + r̃2) (1.9)
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1.7.4 Consistency
I show consistency for fixed T and N →∞. In the limit.
plim
N→∞














































p→ x̄t. Given the weights are generated from the smooth optimization problem
from Section 1.7.1, then by Theorem 1
∑
j wjitxjt
p→ x̄t. By the LLN and Theorem 1,∑
j wjit(εit − εjt)
p→ Ej[εit − εjt] = 0. Since Ej[
↼
εjt] = 0t−1 (0-vector of length t− 1),





p→ 0t−1. Then Equation 1.10 becomes
plim
N→∞




























Assume that Ei(xit− x̄t)2 and Ei[(xit− x̄t)Λt
↼
εit] exist. The summed N terms are now
i.i.d., so by the law of large numbers.
plim
N→∞
























































[(xit − x̄t)(−Λt)] · 0
= 0
Therefore β̂ is consistent.
For observations that are not matched well, one can exclude them from the
regression step. Alternatively, following Abadie et al. (2010) one could downweight
them by their match mean-squared prediction error. Note that as N → ∞, the
proportion of observations that are poorly matched goes to zero.
1.7.5 Normality















































εit + εit]. Notice that E[Li] = 0 and that {Li} are i.i.d..








d→ N(0, V )
.
1.8 Appendix B: Monte-Carlo Study of Estimator Properties
To provide evidence that the wild bootstrap gives valid inference and that the
estimator is appropriate in finite sample, I conduct the following Monte-Carlo study.
The DGP is
yit = β0xit + µiλt + uit
uit ∼ N(0, 1)
β0 = 1
where µi is 1× F , λt is F × 1, and both are unobserved by the econometrician. I vary
the complexity of the DGP by changing the dimension F . With F > 0, xit is made
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correlated with the unobservables through the interactive fixed effects as
xit = ρµiλt + eit
eit ∼ N(0, 1)
µi, λt ∼ N(0F , IF )
ρ = 0.5
With F = 0, there is no interactive fixed-effect and the covariate is exogenous as in
the ideal regression setup. I generate data for T = 8 and vary the sample size.
I estimate the model using a fixed effect OLS regression on the whole data. I
then estimate the model using synthetic regression, setting aside the first T0 = 6
periods just for matching. I use a wild bootstrap with 300 replications. As can be
seen in Figures 1.2a and 1.3a, both the synthetic regression and OLS regression are
consistent and close to the true β0 when F = 0. Notice that the synthetic regression
uses many periods just for matching (and not estimation) and therefore has more
uncertainty at small N .
However, when F = 1 then the synthetic regression performs much better and
improves with sample size. The OLS regression produces estimates much higher
and with confidence intervals that always exclude β0. Nor does the OLS regression
estimates improve with sample size.
In Figures 1.2b and 1.3b I plot the proportion of the time that an estimator
rejects β0 at the 95% level. Ideally this would be .05. Synthetic regression approaches
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Figure 1.2: Comparison of FE OLS to Synthetic Regression with No Unobserved
Factors





























































Notes: For 300 Monte Carlo simulations. DGP is yit = β0xit + uit. β0 = 1, N varies, T is fixed at 8,
u ∼ N(0, 1). x ∼ N(0, 1). OLS regression uses unit fixed-effects. Synthetic regression uses all but the
last 2 periods for just matching and uses 399 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 1.3: Comparison of FE OLS to Synthetic Regression with an Unobserved
Factor:





























































Notes: For 300 Monte Carlo simulations. DGP is yit = β0xit + µiλt + uit. β0 = 1, N varies, T is
fixed at 8, u ∼ N(0, 1). (µi, λt) ∼ N(0, 1), and x = ρµi + N(0, 1) so that x is correlated with the
unobservables. OLS regression uses unit fixed-effects. Synthetic regression uses all but the last 2
periods for just matching and uses 399 bootstrap replications.
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Table 1.11: Border-Pair Sensitivity - All Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N N N N
ln Electricity price -7546.1 -7689.3 1583.5 2487.3
(7123.8) (7016.9) (3303.7) (4373.5)
Nonattainment county 4391.3 4377.4 4821.4∗ 5348.6∗
(3021.4) (3030.8) (2723.7) (2884.7)
No pollution monitor 66098.2
(221300.5)
R2 0.925 0.925 0.999 0.999
FE type coarse coarse fine fine
Weighting border county county border
Observations 48852 48852 48672 48672
Notes: All regressions include cubic polynomials of ozone concentration and
right to work status. Regressions without county FEs also include population
in 1970, miles to central business district, land area and 1990 housing values.
Standard errors clustered at the utility level. Weight-type county=counties have
same total weight. Weight-type border=county comparisons (borders) have same
weight. FE-type coarse=county-pair industry#year state#year, fine=county
county-pair#year. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
this for both models as the sample size increases. OLS regression estimates almost
never include β0 in their confidence intervals when there are interactive fixed effects.
1.9 Appendix C: Additional Tables
Table 1.11 shows estimates from a border-pair design that does not separate
manufacturing into subsectors. The effect of energy prices on total employment is
insignificant and varies in sign depending on the level of detail in the fixed effects.
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Table 1.12: 2020 Projected Contiguous U.S.
and Regional Retail Electricity Price Changes
Due to the Clean Power Plan























Contiguous U.S. 3.2% 3.0%
Source: (EPA, 2015)
Notes: Electricity Market Module regions show in Fig-
ure 1.1 The mass-based compliance option sets a limit
on the total amount of CO2 emitted while the rate-
based cap limits the amount per MWh of generated
electricity.
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Chapter 2: Capitalitis? Effects of the 1960 Brazilian Capital Relocation
2.1 Introduction
Capitals are often the largest cities in their countries. In a dataset of Latin
American cities in 1990, Galiani and Kim (2008) find that being a national capital
is associated with a 919% increase in size. Internationally, a national capital is on
average in the 7th percentile of the population distribution of cities.1 Additionally,
when ranking all cities in a country by population, capital cities are often bigger than
predicted by their position in the ranking. Gabaix (1999) notes that when plotting
log-population against log-rank for cities in a country (“Zipf” plots), capital cities
commonly lie above the best-fit line.
Capitals could be larger than expected for two potential reasons: governments
might elect to have their seats of power in cities with strong growth prospects or city
growth could be positively affected by being a government seat. Previous analyses of
the relationship between capitals and city size (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Galiani and
Kim, 2008) have used only cross-sectional variation to identify the relation between
being a capital and city size. I utilize the 1960 relocation of the Brazilian capital from
Rio de Janeiro to Brasília to estimate what, to my knowledge, are the first causal
1Of countries with at least 20 cities in the UN Statistics Division city size database.
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estimates of gaining and losing capital status. I use a synthetic control identification
strategy (Abadie et al., 2010) to generate counterfactual outcomes for both Rio de
Janeiro and Brasília. My main estimates limit potential control cities to other Brazilian
cities. As a robustness check, I also estimate the treatment effects using international
capital cities as potential comparison cities.
I find that the effect of relocating the capital had insignificant effects on Rio
de Janeiro in terms of population and GDP. The effects on Brasília, however, were
significant, positive, and persistent for both population and GDP. These results are
robust to alternative sets of possible comparisons and to methodologies that omit
areas that have also been affected by the relocation.
Identifying the causal impact of capital designation is both theoretically inter-
esting and policy relevant. At a theoretical level, the effect on Brasília suggests that
capitals do affect population, but the asymmetry implies that this relationship is more
complicated than previous theories account for. Additionally, the effect on Brasília’s
growth rate (as shown later) disappears over time, implying that this shock did not
change the location’s long-run growth rate.
The results can also help inform decisions regarding capital relocations and
related policies. Developing countries sometimes use capital relocations as a regional
development tool (most of the relocations happen in developing countries and reasons
given often involved development). For instance, Argentina has twice considered
moving its capital: in 1987 to the South and in 2014 to the North. In most countries
the relocation of the national capital is a limited tool given there is just one, though
some countries divide the national government functions across cities. Subnational
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state capitals are also relocated. A final, similar policy is the creation of completely
new (“greenfield”) cities. For example, India is pursuing plans for four such cities
(Sharma, 2010).
Aside from estimating the causal impacts of the capital relocation on population
and economic activity, this paper extends the synthetic controls methodology of Abadie
et al. (2010) to situations where some units may interact with each other, for example,
due to migration. I develop a test to check for violations of the stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA) using treated and synthetic control units, a methodology
for dealing with such violations, and a robustness test for inference.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related literature and the
historical background for Brazil. Section 2.3 describes the empirical approach and the
data used. Section 2.4 details the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Literature Review
The first area of related literature is the study of capital cities and population.2
One of the main political theories put forward for the primacy of capital cities is by
Ades and Glaeser (1995). They posit that rulers stay in power by buying off potential
revolutionaries (capital residents) by transferring resources from the hinterland to the
urban masses. With a simple spatial equilibrium setup this leads then to more in-
2This is closely related to the study of primate (i.e., largest) cities (many papers treat capitals
and primate cities interchangeably as they are so highly correlated). More generally this research
focuses on understanding why some countries have a high proportion of their urban population
concentrated in a few cities. See for example, Krugman and Elizondo (1996) who develop a trade-
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migration into the capital. They theorize, and find evidence to support in cross-section,
that primacy is more likely in dictatorships and unstable democracies. Another reason
for capital-city bias in public expenditures is put forward by Galiani and Kim (2008).
They collect more extensive information on cities in the US and Latin America. In
cross-sectional regressions of population on capital city status (both provincial and
country) for 1900 and 1990 separately, they show that capital city status is more
important for city size in Latin America than in the US. They posit that this could be
due to a bias in the provision of public goods to capital cities which could be caused
by less political decentralization in Latin America.
A second branch of related literature investigates at how persistent are shocks
to cities as compared to their long-run fundamentals. Davis and Weinstein (2002)
find that Japanese cities rebounded quickly after WWII bombings. Studies of other
wars have found similar results (Brakman et al., 2004; Paskoff, 2008; Miguel and
Roland, 2011). On the other side, Bleakley and Lin (2012) examine river portage
sites in the US and find that a century after their natural advantage disappeared
they are still larger than comparison areas and this effect in levels did not diminish
over time. Long-run effects are also found in regards to government programs such as
the Tennessee Valley Authority (Kline and Moretti, 2013) and the expansion of the
railroad network (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2013).
Finally, there are papers that examine at the effects of the locations of capital
cities. Campante and Do (2014) find, using IV estimates, that isolated US state
based economic geography model of urban concentration, Davis and Henderson (2003) who note
correlates of urban concentration, and Soo (2005) who models the city sizes as a Pareto distribution
(ln sizei = const+ β · ln ranki) and tests Zipf’s law by testing if β = −1.
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capital cities have more federal corruption cases per resident and have more money in
politics. They believe this is due to the fact that isolation is also associated with less
newspaper coverage, voter knowledge, and voter turnout. Campante et al. (2014) focus
on the isolation of country capitals and find that their isolation is associated with:
misgovernance in autocracies, less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by
capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites. Morten
and Oliveira (2014) use the same Brazilian capital city change to analyze the effect of
migration costs on inter-regional real-wage differences. They use the set of new roads
built connecting Brasília to state capitals to identify a structural spatial equilibrium
model. They estimate their model on 131 “meso-regions” using data from 1980-2000
and find that migration costs substantially inhibit migration.
2.2.2 Brazilian Context
I use the Brazilian capital relocation for several reasons. First, it transferred all
capital functions, which is the most common type of relocation. Second, the distance
to the new location was substantial, which helps separate the effects on the original and
final locations. Third, the timing of the move did not coincide with any major border
change in Brazil, which could have change the importance of the capital city. Finally,
Brazil has high quality data on local population and GDP available both before and
after the move for all domestic cities. All of the other recent capital relocations (Table
2.1 lists 29 relocations since 1950) lack one or more of these features.
3Brazil’s states are completely divided into municipalities.
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Before the 1960 relocation, the capital of Brazil was the municipality3 of Rio de
Janeiro (which today is the capital of the state of Rio de Janeiro). Rio de Janeiro
became the capital in 1763 when it was moved from Salvador. The plan to move the
capital from Rio de Janeiro to a more interior location was originally conceived in
1827 by José Bonifácio, an adviser to Emperor Pedro I. He presented a plan for a
new city called Brasília. The constitutions of 1891, 1934 and 1946 all stated that the
capital should be moved to a place closer to the center of the country. The reasons
mentioned for this move (Morten and Oliveira, 2014) included regional development,
promoting nationalism,4 and removing the capital from Rio de Janeiro because it was
crowded, too “international”, received too much national attention, and as a port was
vulnerable to military attacks by sea.
The decision to move the capital in 1960 had much to do with the particulars of
Juscelino Kubitschek, the president from 1956 to 1961. According to Epstein (1973),
Juscelino admitted that when he was campaigning for the presidency he had not
thought thoroughly about the issue until a spectator asked whether he would move the
capital. He replied that he would. He stuck with that campaign pledge and ordered
the construction of Brasília when he became president. Juscelino might also have been
inclined to the idea as he previously was the governor of the state of Minas Gerais,
which had previously constructed the planned capital city of Belo Horizonte.5
Construction on Brasília began in 1956 and the new capital was inaugurated on
April 21, 1960 (Epstein, 1973). For my analyses I consider the treatment date as 1956
4For example, the border state Acre was originally the territory of Bolivia, but was settled by
Brazilians who resisted Bolivian control and in 1903 was officially given to Brazil.
5The state of Goiás also began constructing the city of Goiânia in 1933 which became the capital
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(the main results are robust to using the inauguration date of 1960). It became the
only municipality of the new Federal District which was created from land removed
from the state of Goiás. Brasília is also the name of the central municipal sub-district,
but I use the term to refer to the entire municipality. In 1960 the city was far from
complete. Many federal agencies stayed in Rio de Janeiro for some time. The Ministry
of External Relations, for example, did not move until 1970, with foreign embassies
moving even later (Mendes, 1995, p. 27).
The stability and decentralization of Brazil are indicative of what the theories
of Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Galiani and Kim (2008) would predict for Brazil’s
capital. The government of Brazil during this period was quite unstable. Brazil was a
constitutional indigenous monarchy from 1822-1889. After a military coup in 1889
it was nominally a constitutional democracy until 1930 but was de facto controlled
by oligarchs of the dominant São Paulo and Minas Gerais states. A military junta
took power and controlled the country from 1930-1945. A bloodless military coup
ushered in a democratic regime from 1945-64. A military dictatorship again took over
and ruled between 1964–85. Finally in 1985 Brazil became a democracy. Ades and
Glaeser (1995) counted Brazil as an unstable democracy in their earliest data period
of 1960-1964 (their earliest data for dictatorship does not begin until 1972) so by their
theory the capital status should be contributing to its size.
For the level of decentralization in Brazil, I use the World Bank’s Fiscal De-
centralization Indicators’ percentage of government expenditures that happen below
the national level. Brazil first appears in the international data in 1980 with 32% of
of Goiás in 1937.
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its expenditures being sub-national. Of the 56 countries that have data, Brazil was
more decentralized than 43. Using data from Brazil (that is not directly comparable)
it appears that this percentage of subnational expenditures was stable from 1956
till 1980. Given the theory suggested in Galiani and Kim (2008), this high level of
decentralization could imply that their might be little population advantage to being
the capital of Brazil.
Finally, I should note that while I estimate the effects of the relocation, data on
the costs of the relocation are hard to determine. Estimates for the cost of building
Brasília vary as formal records were not well kept. While the government raised
some revenue through the sale of residential lots in Brasília, a typical estimate for the
government’s spending is 2-3% of GDP over the period 1956-1960 (250-300 billion
Cruzeiros or 400-600 million USD in 1960) according to Gordon (2006).
2.3 Empirical Strategy
I estimate the effect that the relocation of the Brazilian capital in 1960 had on
the population and GDP of Rio de Janeiro (the old capital) and Brasília (the new
capital). In a standard spatial equilibrium model (e.g., Moretti 2011), population is
an aggregate measure of the desirability of a locality, encompassing both economic
productivity and non-productive amenities. While GDP does not account for non-
productive amenities, the GDP data differentiate between private and government
sector GDP. This enables me to estimate the effect that the capital relocation had on
purely private sector economic activity.
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In this setting, identifying causal effects is complicated by the fact that the
capital is relocated only once. I therefore use the synthetic controls methodology of
Abadie et al. (2010) to generate counterfactual outcomes for the two “treated” localities.
The estimated treatment effects are inclusive of any other policies that occurred at
the same time as the capital relocation and that differentially affected Rio de Janeiro
or Brasília. For instance, they include the effect of new highways that were built to
connect the new capital of Brasília to nearby cities. These types of infrastructure
investments often accompany capital relocations so they should be thought of as part
of the broader program of a capital relocation.
2.3.1 Synthetic Controls
To create counterfactual outcomes for Rio de Janeiro and Brasília I use a
synthetic controls strategy of Abadie et al. (2010). Similar to a difference-in-difference
design, synthetic controls exploits the difference in treatment and untreated units
across the event of interest. However, in contrast to a difference-in-differences design,
synthetic controls does not give all untreated units the same weight in the comparison.
Instead, it generates a weighted average of the untreated units that closely matches
the treated unit over the pre-treatment period. Outcomes for this synthetic control
are then projected into the post-treatment period using the weights identified from the
pre-treatment comparison. This projection is used as the counterfactual for the treated
unit. The identifying assumption is that the weighted average is a valid counterfactual
for the post-treatment treated unit.
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One data-generating process which satisfies the identifying assumption is the
following model of unobserved factors. Let D be an indicator for treatment and the
observed outcome variable Yjt (for unit j and time t) is the sum of a time-varying
treatment effect αjtDjt and the no-treatment counterfactual Y Njt , which is specified
using a factor model
Yjt = αjtDjt + Y
N
jt = αjtDjt + (δt + θtZj + λtµj + εjt) (2.1)
where δt is an unknown time factor, Zj is a (r × 1) vector of observed covariates
unaffected by treatment, θt is a (1× r) vector of unknown parameters, λt is a (1× F )
vector of unknown factors, µj is a (F × 1) vector of unknown factor loadings, and the
error εjt is independent across units and time with zero mean. Letting the first unit
be the treated unit, the treatment effect is estimated by approximating the unknown
Y N1t with a weighted average of untreated units




In my application, the outcome Y is a measure of local population or GDP.
Equation 2.1 simplifies to the traditional fixed effect equation if λtµj = µj. The
fixed effect model allows for any unobserved heterogeneity that is time-invariant. The
factor model employed by synthetic controls also allows for the existence of non-parallel
trends between treated and untreated units after controlling for observables. When
dealing with aggregate data as I do, εjt captures specification error rather than the
60
standard sampling error. More specifically, εjt measures the inability of the model to
match a “synthetic” control to the treated unit.
2.3.1.1 Estimation
Let T0 be the number of pre-treatment periods of the T total periods. Index
units {1, ..., J + 1} such that the first unit is the treated unit and the others are
“donors”. Let Y j be (T × 1) vector of outcomes for unit j and Y 0 be the (T × J)
matrix of outcomes for all donors. Let W be a (J × 1) observation-weight matrix
(w2, w3, ..., wJ+1)
′ where
∑J+1
j=2 wj = 1 and wj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {2, ..., J + 1}. A weighted
average of donors over the outcome is constructed as Y 0W . Partition the outcome




Y j). Let X represent a
set of k pre-treatment characteristics (“predictors”). This includes Z (the observed
covariates above) and M linear combinations of
↼
Y so that k = r +M . Analogously,
let X0 be the (k × J) matrix of donor predictors. Let V be a (k × k) variable-weight
matrix indicating the relative significance of the predictor variables.
Given Y and X, estimation of synthetic controls consists of finding the op-
timal weighting matrices W and V . Following Abadie et al. (2010), I pick V to
minimize the prediction error of the pre-treatment outcome between the treated






∥∥∥↼Y 1 − ↼Y 0W∥∥∥ is then the pre-treatment root mean squared
prediction error (RMSPE) with a given weighted average of the control units. W
is picked to minimize the RMSPE of the predictor variables, ‖X1 −X0W ‖V . In
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this way, the treated unit and its synthetic control are similar along dimensions that
matter for predicting pre-treatment outcomes. Abadie et al. (2010) suggest nesting
the optimization problems where the inner problem is finding W (V )
W (V ) = arg min
W
‖X1 −X0W ‖V (2.3)
Then, armed with the optimal W (V ), I find the optimal V such that
V = arg min
V
∥∥∥↼Y 1 − ↼Y 0W (V )∥∥∥ (2.4)
The variables in X should be chosen to be good predictors. Including too many
variables in X may cause the model to be over fit, predicting well in the pre-treatment
periods while predicting poorly in the out-of-sample post-treatment periods. While
Abadie et al. (2010) do not address this directly, Dube and Zipperer (2015) use a
cross-validation approach to address this model selection problem. To implement
this, for a given predictor set X l, identify how well the synthetic control estimation
estimates the actual path for the donors. Synthetic controls should ideally predict
the actual path of the donors quite well as they are assumed to be unaffected by
treatment. For each donor j ≥ 2, I estimate a donor specific V j(X l) and W j(X l)
that match unit j to the other (J − 1) units in the donor pool. I then measure∥∥∥⇀Y j − ⇀Y 0,−jW j(X l)∥∥∥, where ⇀Y 0,−j is the matrix of post-treatment outcomes for all
donors except unit j. For possible predictor sets {X1, ...,XL}, I find the X l that has
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the lowest RMSPE in the post-treatment periods when estimating synthetic controls
on all the donors,




∥∥∥⇀Y j − ⇀Y 0,−jW j(X l)∥∥∥ (2.5)
The estimated treatment effect is then the difference between the treated unit and
the synthetic control during the post-treatment periods. I can look at either a single
period difference, Y1t−Y 0tW for t > T0, or the RMSPE over all post-treatment years,∥∥∥⇀Y 1 − ⇀Y 0W∥∥∥.
If weights can be found such that the synthetic control matches the treated unit









tλt is non-singular, then α̂1 has a bias that goes to zero as the number of
pre-intervention periods grows large relative to the scale of the εjt.
2.3.1.2 Inference
After estimation, significance is determined by running permutation tests. Given
an estimated effect α̂1, I can characterize the null-distribution {α̂p} by performing the
same synthetic control estimation on the donors. If estimating placebo effects on the
donors yields many “effects” as large as α̂1, then it is likely that α̂1 was observed by
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chance. This non-parametric test has the advantage of not imposing any distribution
on the errors.
The quality of the pre-treatment match in each permutation may vary signifi-
cantly. If the match is poor, then the post-treatment prediction error is also likely to
be large. Therefore, when comparing α̂1 to {α̂p}, I take match quality into account.
Let sj be the RMSPE for pre-treatment years when estimating synthetic controls for
unit j, so s1 =
∥∥∥↼Y 1 − ↼Y 0W∥∥∥ and sj≥2 = ∥∥∥↼Y j − ↼Y 0,−jW j∥∥∥. There are two ways to
take match quality into account.
1. Limit the comparison distribution to only those cases p where sp ≤ zs1 for some
cut-off value z. Abadie et al. (2010) list statistics for z ∈ {1, 5,∞} where z =∞
signifies comparing α̂1 to {α̂p} = {α̂j}J+1j=2 without regard to pre-treatment match
quality.
2. Construct a t-like statistic, τ = α̂/s so that effects are weighted by their match
quality and then compare τ1 to {τp}.
In practice, neither adjustment affects the results.
Confidence intervals for the main effect α̂1 are constructed of all points {αc}
such that the test of H0 : α0 = αc against H1 : α0 6= αc is not rejected at the given
significance level γ. For scalar values I employ a two-side test and reject the null
hypothesis if (α̂1−αc) is in extreme γ-proportion of {‖α̂p‖}p. Since the p-value changes
discretely, this essentially trims the extremes of the null distribution and then fits the
width around the main effect. That is CIα1−γ = {α̂1 − α̂p|q(‖α̂p‖) < 1− γ} where q(.)
is the quantile function. If dim(α) = K > 1 then I take into account the variance-
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covariance of {α̂p} so that ‖α̂p‖ =
√
(α̂p − ᾱ)′Ω̂−1(α̂p − ᾱ). To calculate the confidence
interval for functions of estimated parameters I follow the procedure of Woutersen and
Ham (2013). For a function f(α), a function of directly estimated quantities, I apply
f(.) to CIα1−γ . I use functions of estimated parameters in two cases: taking the ratios
of estimated effects for two industries and taking the sum of population effects between
pairs of cities. In the first one, dim(α) = 2, and CIf(α)1−γ = {α̂p,1/α̂p,2|α̂p ∈ CIα1−γ}. In
the second case dim(α) = 1 and CI1−γ = {α̂p + α̂p′ |α̂p, α̂p′ ∈ CIα1−γ}.
2.3.1.3 Interpolation Bias
If Y is a highly nonlinear function ofX and the support ofX is large, then there
may be interpolation bias so thatWY 0 is not be a good approximation for the outcome
of a hypothetical unit with characteristics WX0. More formally, interpolation bias
implies that
∑
wjY (Xj; ·) 6≈ Y (
∑
wjXj; ·). Abadie et al. (2010) suggest limiting
the donor pool to those with similar Xs. With city growth, a major concern is
size-related congestion. To deal with this possibility, I explore limiting the donor pool
to localities of similar sizes. I pick the optimal size bandwidth by cross-validation.
2.3.1.4 Identifying Uncontaminated Donors
A key assumption above is that the εjt are independent across units. This is a
version of SUTVA. However, when considering population flows, a treatment shock
that increases population in one locality usually does so by increasing migration. This
increase in migration must reflect a decrease in population in another unit. These
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other, “contaminated” units could detrimentally affect the estimation in two ways.
First, if these units are used in the synthetic control for one of the treated units, then
it can bias the estimated treatment effect. For example, if the localities adjacent to
Brasília were (a) picked for the synthetic control of Brasília, and (b) lost population
due to emigration to Brasília, then Brasília’s synthetic control will be smaller than it
should be, biasing the estimate for Brasília upwards. A second way that contaminated
donors could affect estimation is that when estimating synthetic controls on the donors,
their prediction errors may be different as a result of the treatment. This distorts the
null distribution and leads to mistaken inference.
I use two methods to deal with potentially contaminated donors. First, I assume
that all localities spatially close to the treated unit are contaminated and therefore
unsuitable as donors. To implement this strategy, I remove all localities that are in
the same state as the treated unit.
The second method utilizes placebo tests over time and across units. If the
null-distribution is distorted by contaminated donors, this can be used to identify
them. With sufficient independence between the contaminated donors and the units
that compose the synthetic controls for the contaminated donors, then donors that
are contaminated will have larger predicted errors in the post-treatment period. I use
the distribution of these errors to determine which units to consider as contaminated.
Ideally, I would know the distribution of prediction errors for the population in the
absence of treatment. Knowing this, I could identify if there are more units with
larger-than-predicted errors, which would result in a distribution with fatter tails. Real
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predicted errors with absolute size above some threshold defined by the counterfactual
distribution are flagged as having a high likelihood of being contaminated.
As I do not know the counterfactual distribution of prediction errors, I approx-
imate it with a new set of placebo tests that are one period earlier.6 I do this by
generating prediction errors while assuming that the treatment affected units in 1950,
ten years before the capital was actually moved.
The procedure is:
1. Estimate synthetic controls on all localities assuming that the first post-treatment
period is 1950. Collect the prediction errors for 1950.
2. Estimate synthetic controls on all localities assuming that the first post-treatment
period is 1960. Collect the prediction errors for 1960.
3. Consider a unit as contaminated if its 1960 prediction error is in the top/bottom
α% of prediction errors for 1950.
4. Re-run the main estimation with these contaminated donors removed.7
2.3.2 Data
The municipal population statistics come from the Brazilian Institute of Geogra-
phy and Statistics (IBGE) national censuses of 1872, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1940,
1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 and the National Counts of 1996, 2007. The
6Using the existing 1960 distribution (e.g., considering as treated all units with real prediction
errors in the top and bottom 5%) would just order units by the size of the error and not be informative
of how many units were really affected.
7This will change the synthetic controls estimated for the other donors and therefore change their
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international population data I use for a robustness test comes from the Populstat
compilation of historic city populations (Lahmeyer, 2006). Principally, the Populstat
data is derived from the Almanach de Gotha in early years and from national censuses
in later years. I remove some Populstat sources where it appears that they had
different definitions of city boundaries.
Estimations of local GDP are available from Brazil’s Institute of Applied Eco-
nomic Research (IPEA) for 1920, 1939, 1949, 1959, 1970, and many more recent years.
Local government GDP figures are available for the same years except for 1949 and
1959, where only state figures are available. I estimate the government GDP for 1949
using the municipal government GDP per capita in 1939 and adjust for changes in
municipal population and state government GDP from 1939 to 1949. To lengthen the
matching period I also extrapolate both the total and government municipal figures
to 1900 and 1910. I use the 1920 levels per capita and adjust for changing municipal
population and federal government expenditures back to 1910 and 1900.
For information on the size of government employment in the municipalities
I transcribe the industry employment count data for selected municipalities from
the IBGE census reports for 1940, 1950, 1970, and 1980 (the data from 1960 are
incompatible). To lengthen the matching period, I also extrapolate these figures to
earlier censuses by using earlier population changes. The construction of Brasília
was done by the Urbanization Company of New Capital (Novacap) a state enterprise.
The census data, however, records these workers in the larger “Industrial Activities”
prediction errors.
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category. State-level samples from IPUMS, however, classify the workers more finely,
so I am able to add construction workers to the public employees for Brasília.
I use a variety of additional data in the pre-treatment stage that could be pre-
dictive of future growth. From the IBGE “Cidades” project I use climatic information
(yearly rainfall and mean winter and summer temperatures) and latitude and longitude
(I use the center point of the of “bounding box” of the maps of each municipality).
For a measure of the distance to the sea, I use NASA’s Distance From Coast dataset
and use the municipality’s center point. As a rough measure of amenities I use a list
of municipalities that had soccer teams during the pre-treatment period using the
list of early soccer team founding dates from RSSSF Brazil (2014). I use municipal
area information from IPEA and some individual-level data from the 1960 and 1970
IPUMS 5% samples.
While the data for Brazil is available at the municipal-level, these boundaries have
changed over time. To deal with this, IPEA aggregated municipalities to Minimum
Comparable Areas (MCAs) such that the MCAs’ boundaries remain constant from
1872 to the present. Rio’s municipal boundaries have not changed since 1872. However,
the MCA for Brasília consists of 21 small, current and former municipalities. In the
sparsely-settled West, where new states and municipalities were recently created, some
MCAs are quite large in area while still small in population. All municipal-level
estimations are done at the MCA level and I refer to them as “localities”.
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2.4 Results
To conduct the main estimation I first complete the preliminary tasks of picking
the optimization parameters for synthetic controls. Then I analyze local population
effects on Brasília and Rio de Janeiro along with separate robustness checks. After
that I estimate spillovers to neighboring localities. Finally, I estimate the effects on
GDP and its components (public and private) for both treated locations.
2.4.1 Picking Optimization Parameters
I use a data-driven approach to select the optimal predictor sets, size bandwidth,
and identifying uncontaminated donors.
2.4.1.1 Optimal Predictor Set
I pick the optimal set of predictors using cross validation. One set of predictor
variables that is common in the synthetic control literature is all pre-treatment response
variables
↼
Y . When including other pre-treatment characteristics (Z), some of the
components of
↼
Y must be removed otherwise the optimization will put zero weight on
the Z (as noted by Dube and Zipperer 2015). For my predictor sets I then use every
other period of Y and then additional Z variables. I break my additional predictors
into thematic groups: geographic (area, coordinates, distance to sea), climate (rainfall,
summer & winter temperatures), economic (GDP per capita in 1920, 1939, 1949 and
GDP’s public service administration component for 1920, 1939), facilities (football
teams), and other population ranks (1950 rank of population and population density).
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With these five groups I estimate all possible combinations. The set of predictors that
gives the lowest RMSPE for the donors is the set that includes every other predictor
variables along with all the additional predictors.
2.4.1.2 Optimal Size Bandwidth
I also select a bandwidth for a locality’s rank in the population distribution via
cross-validation. This bandwidth is used to help match each locality to other units. I
consider possible quantile values {1, 0.5, 0.3, 0.25, 0.1} (where 1 indicates there is no
such limit and 0.1 indicates that only localities in the same decile may be considered
as matchable donors). The bandwidth with the lowest RMSPE for the donors is 0.3,
so I use that in all the following population estimations.
2.4.1.3 Identifying Uncontaminated Donors
I test for contaminated donors by comparing the distribution of prediction
errors when treating 1950 as the first post-treatment period to the distribution that
(correctly) treats 1960 as the first post-treatment period. The errors are only for the
first post-treatment period in each case. I shift the predictor variables back one decade
when possible so that the predictors have the same relationship to the treatment date
in both cases. The distribution of prediction errors for the 1950 placebo-case is shown
in Figure 2.1. One can see that there is a single unit, Brasília, with a very large
positive prediction error in 1960. Other than this, the distributions are quite similar,
despite not scaling either distribution. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can not reject that
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Notes: Kernel density of prediction errors from separate synthetic controls, each using six
pre-treatment periods of population.
the two are drawn from the same distribution (p-value=.707). Therefore, it does not
appear that there are large general equilibrium effects. The population that migrated
to Brasília came likely from Rio de Janeiro and, in insignificant amounts, from the
rest of Brazil.
There are three options then for dealing with possibly contaminated donors: (1)
drop none, (2) drop the nearby ones (those in the same state), and (3) drop those with
1960 prediction errors above the cut-off levels for the 1950 prediction errors (which in
this case are the 25 localities shown in Figure 2.16). As would be suggested by the
lack of significant differences between the 1950 and 1960 prediction error distributions,
the main results do not vary with the procedure used. I elect to label the results that
use option (3) as the Main Results and the others as robustness checks. In particular,
the results when using method (2) are shown in Figure 2.15.
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2.4.2 Population
There are two details worth noting about how I construct the outcome variable.
First, as synthetic controls is essentially a linear estimation method it has smaller pre-
diction errors when matching on log population figures rather than on raw population.
Second, synthetic controls match better when the treated unit’s pre-treatment data
lie in the convex hull of the donor data. This is not always the case for the treated
units as Rio de Janeiro is largest locality in Brazil for many years. I therefore demean
the log-population figures when matching (I add back in the mean for all figures).8
When comparing Rio de Janeiro to other national capitals I estimate models both
with log population and demeaned log population. In all estimations, the treated unit
is never outside the convex hull of the donors for pre-treatment years.9
I first use other Brazilian localities as donors to estimate population causal
effects. Effects are estimated separately for each “treated” unit (dropping the opposing
unit from the donor list). I then perform robustness checks for each treated unit.
Finally, I check for spill-overs in neighboring localities.
2.4.2.1 Domestic Comparisons
My preferred specification, is to use the other localities in Brazil as potential
donors. It allows me to hold constant many national-level effects. This provides many
8Assuming Y 0 is full rank, demeaning is equivalent to matching on the original data but allowing
unrestricted match weights.
9I also disregard two other measures common used in the literature. I do not consider population
density as Rio has the maximum value in several periods. I also do not consider the urban population
in each locality as this distinction was only began in 1940, leaving only two pre-treatment periods.
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consistent pre-treatment variables to match on. It also offers many donor units to
improve the inference from permutation tests.
The results when matching on demeaned log population are shown in Figure
2.2. For each estimation I show 95% confidence intervals around the estimated
counterfactual using 376 permutations. Confidence intervals are shown using the
unrestricted set of donor prediction errors. Significance levels, for each year and for
different null-distributions are shown in Section 2.8. They do not, however, change the
graphical interpretations. Brasília experiences a significant and substantial increase in
population for the whole post-treatment period. While the effect on Brasília is large in
percentage terms, it was not a significant driver of national population movement. The
estimated effect on Brasília’s 1960 population was .2% of total Brazilian population
and 1.2% of residents who had migrated in the last decade.
Rio de Janeiro experienced a negative but insignificant effect for the whole
post-treatment period. In 1950 it had a population of 2.4 million. Its population
increased to 3.3 million in 1960 and 6.3 million in 2010. For Rio de Janeiro to have
experienced a significant negative impact, its population would have to have remained
below 2.9 million in 1960 and 3.5 million in 2010.
The variable weights (V ), the similarity between X1 and WX0, and the top
locality matches (W ) for the estimation are shown in Appendix 2.10. The pre-
treatment population variables are most predictive of future population with minor
weight given to summer temperatures and latitude. The treated units match their
synthetic controls quite well for variables that have high predictive value. The highest
weight any donor locality receives in the synthetic control is .35 which suggests the
74
Figure 2.2: Estimated Population Effects












1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea,
latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for













1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea,
latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for
control from 376 permutation tests. 11% of the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
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results are not driven by a single donor. A map of the estimated effects on the donors
is shown in Figure 2.13.
A final check is to see if the procedure does good job of predicting the path for
Rio de Janeiro and Brasília for the latter part of the pre-treatment period matching
on just earlier data from the pre-treatment period.. I do this by reserving the last
pre-treatment period as a validation period. The prediction errors for the last pre-
treatment period are insignificant (see tables 2.4 and 2.5) implying that the procedure
does well at matching the treated units in general. Matching on growth-rates instead
of log population presents similar results and are show in Figure 2.12.
The new residents of Brasília came from all over Brazil, though the largest
concentration came from nearby states. This is shown in Table 2.11 using census micro
data to identify the state-to-state migration flows for 1960 and 1970 (municipal-level
dataa are not in the sample extract until 1980). Similarly, Rio de Janeiro sent most
emigrants to its two neighboring states (Brasília is third on the list). Distinguishing
how much of Brasília’s rise is due to a Rio de Janeiro’s loss is difficult. While there
was some direct migration it is difficult to say if there were diverted migration flows
(Brasília receiving migrants that would have otherwise gone to Rio de Janeiro). In
Figure 2.14 I show the sum of the effects for Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. The results
are close to zero and consistently insignificant. As I argue later, this implies that we
should view the government as merely shifting a fixed quantity of resources between
the two locations.
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1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Brasilia neighbors Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea,
latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for
control from 376 permutation tests. 10% of the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
2.4.2.2 Population Robustness
For Brasília, one scenario that would confound interpretation of the effect is if
the planning commission picked Brasília because they expected it to grow quickly in
the future compared to other similar locations. The planning commission report to the
Brazilian senate that suggested the current site of Brasília also noted the alternative
site of Tupaciguara. It is similar in terms of geographic factors. It also borders Goiás
and Minas Gerais. Brasília’s current site was selected by the congress because it
was the farther North and there are more Northern states represented in the senate
Epstein (1973). If Brasília was positively selected then one might expect the same
positive selection to be exist for Tupaciguara. From Figure 2.3, however, one can see
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that Tupaciguara did not grow faster than its history would lead us to believe. This
suggests that Brasília was unlikely to be positively selected.
For Rio de Janeiro, I perform a robustness test against other country capital
cities. In this setup all the donors share the same pre-treatment characteristic that
they are national capitals. I identify 37 separate countries that were independent since
1900 and that have consistent historical capital city population data in the Populstat
data.10 The data vary between cities. On average the first data point is in 1850 and
they have 16 population statistics before 1956 and 8 after 1956. To make the data
comparable, I interpolate using cubic splines and then sample every 10 years from
1880 to 1990. As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the point estimate for the effect on Rio de
Janeiro is small and far from significant. While this estimate addresses the concern
about some units possibly interacting with each other it does have a few downsides.
First, the data come from different sources (and sometimes different sources for the
same city over time) so it is noisier. Second, I currently only use population data.
Finally, there are fewer units so it is less likely that the synthetic control will be a
great match. My preferred estimation for this is matching on demeaned log population
as shown in Figure 2.4. The results show a slightly positive but insignificant effect for
Rio de Janeiro. The results are similar when matching on log population though the
fit is worse.
10Countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paragua, US, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Liberia, Japan, China, Thailand, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, France, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxemborg, Norway, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Russia
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Figure 2.4: Population - Rio de Janeiro (Cross-Country)















1880 1920 1960 1990
Year
Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 84% CIs
Notes: Predictors: Pre-treatment population. Confidence intervals for control from 37 permutation
tests. 29% of the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.














1880 1920 1960 1990
Year
Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 84% CIs
Notes: Predictors: Pre-treatment population. Confidence intervals for control from 37 permutation
tests. 42% of the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
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2.4.2.3 Neighboring Areas
I next estimate spillovers in neighboring localities. I aggregate the localities that
border Rio de Janeiro and Brasília into single units and separately estimate their
effects. Given the sizes of the localities, the neighbors of Rio de Janeiro can be thought
of as part of the larger Rio de Janeiro urban agglomeration. This is not the case
for the neighbors of Brasília as they were never part of a larger agglomeration. The
results are shown in Figure 2.5. In both cases I find slightly positive, but insignificant
effects.
2.4.3 Sectoral Employment
Figure 2.6 shows the effects on public sector employment for Rio de Janeiro
and Brasília. Figure 2.7 shows the corresponding figures for private (non-public)
employment. In both figures, there is a large and significant effect on Brasília and
there is no significant effect on Rio de Janeiro. For Brasília, the ratio of the effect
on total employment to the effect on public employees is 2.84 with a 95% confidence
interval of (2.59,2.98). This implies that for every additional government job that was
created, an addition 1.7 non-public jobs were created. This number, however, should
not be viewed as a causal effect of just the government employment as the capital
relocation had effects other than shifting government employment. This is on the high
end for employment multipliers. The closest would be Moretti (2010) who finds a
multiplier of 2.5 for new skilled positions in cities.
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Figure 2.5: Effect on Neighbor Populations












1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Rio de Janeiro neighbors Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea,
latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for

















1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Brasilia neighbors Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea,
latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for
control from 376 permutation tests. 10% of the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
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One reason that this multiplier is large is that the government intervened in the
housing market in Brasília. Novacap built apartment blocks and provided subsides
for those living there. This likely controlled one potential channel for congestion by
keeping rents down.
2.4.4 Sectoral GDP
Finally, I estimate effects on real municipal GDP. I estimate effects for both
total GDP, and its public and private components.
The results in Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 show the effects for both treated units
using total, public, and private GDP. Brasília shows a consistent positive effect in all
post-treatment periods and for all GDP measures. Rio de Janeiro shows a negative
effect for public GDP that becomes marginally significant after 2004. This is less than
convincing as it is 50 years after treatment and no other effects show up in private or
total GDP.
For Brasília, the 1970, estimated effects are BRL 1.362 million (all figures are
in 2000 BRL) on government GDP, BRL 3.954 million on total GDP, implying an
approximate fiscal multiplier of 2.93 with a 95% confidence interval of (2.89,2.95). This
should be considered an upper bound on the fiscal multiplier as there were associated
actions (new highway construction) that are not counted in the government effect (as
they were outside of this territory) but which likely increased total GDP in Brasília.
Even so, it is on the high side of existing fiscal multiplier estimates. CBO (2012)
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Figure 2.6: Effect on Municipal Public Administration Employment















1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Year
Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP
for public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence
football teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals














1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Year
Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for
control from 330 permutation tests.
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Figure 2.7: Effect on Municipal Private-Sector Employment















1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Year
Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP
for public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence
football teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals
















1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Year
Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for
control from 330 permutation tests.
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Figure 2.8: Effect on Municipal GDP


















Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP
for public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence
football teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950)Confidence intervals
















Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950)Confidence intervals for
control from 215 permutation tests.
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surveys studies and finds a high estimate of 2.5 for the purchases of goods and services
by the federal government in the US.
2.5 Discussion
The 1960 relocation of the Brazilian capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília
appears to have had a large and significant effect on Brasília. Conversely, the move
appears not to have affected Rio de Janeiro to any large extent. However, my
estimation strategy estimates differences in proportions, so insignificant effects for
Rio de Janeiro could be large in absolute terms when compared to Brasília. While
the sum of the effects on total population for Rio de Janeiro and Brasília was very
close to zero (Figure 2.14), it was not that the government moved a fixed quantity of
resources when it relocated the capital. Figure 2.1111 shows that the sum of effects on
public GDP was positive and significantly different from zero.
It is not surprising that Rio de Janeiro did not suffer a significant decline. There
were no significant changes in the public sector employment or GDP for Rio. The
shift away from Rio de Janeiro seems to have been gradual enough to not disrupt
the local labor markets. Additionally, several recent papers have noted asymmetric
responses to shocks. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Henderson and Venables (2009)
show that cities lose less population to negative shocks than they gain from positive
shocks in settings where there is durable capital in the cities. Rauch (1993) provides
11I trust the GDP estimates more than the employment estimates are they do not suffer from
report bias nor the miscategorization of those indirectly employed by the government.
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Figure 2.9: Effect on Municipal Public Administration GDP


















Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP
for public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence
football teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950)Confidence intervals


















Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950)Confidence intervals for
control from 215 permutation tests.
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Figure 2.10: Effect on Municipal Private-Sector GDP



















Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP
for public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence
football teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950)Confidence intervals

















Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors include response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to
sea, latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950)Confidence intervals for
control from 215 permutation tests.
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Brasilia + Rio 95% CIs
Notes: Confidence intervals for control from 200 permutation tests.
another mechanism for such asymmetry where there are agglomeration economies and
there is a first-mover disadvantage for firms leaving a large city.
While I am able to say that the relocation had a large effect on employment, a
lack of available data precludes looking at the other main channels of response that
one would expect to see in an urban setting. Municipal wage and rent data is not
available before the relocation. Even for 1960 and 1970 it is only available at the
state-level. Similarly there is no adequate migration data before the relocation. Along
with the capital relocation, new radial highways were constructed from Brasília. While
these may have lowered transportation-costs between Brasília and state-capital cities,
it is unlikely that this was a large driver of Brasília’s rise given that effects are seen




In this paper I estimate the first causal effects of capital city designation by
using the capital relocation-event in Brazil in 1960. I find that receiving the capital
designation had large, positive effects on total population; public and private GDP;
and public and private employment of Brasília. For Rio de Janeiro, the former capital,
I find no significant impact on public sector employment or GDP and consequently
no impact on the private sector or total population. The relocation was not a simple
transfer of resources, but was accompanied by an increase in public spending pooled
over the two municipalities. Likely the speed of withdraw from Rio de Janeiro was
slow and its large labor markets facilitated local labor reallocation.
I also propose new tests and procedures for applying synthetic controls to
situations where some units may directly influence each other. Hopefully these will
increase the use of th newer Synthetic Control Methods in spatial settings.
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2.7 Appendix - Capital City Relocations
Table 2.1: Capital City Relocations since 1950
Year Old New Country
ID prob-
lems Notes
1950 Tel Aviv-Jaffo Jerusalem Israel CC
1954 Trieste Rome (Trieste) Italy CC
1959 Karachi Rawalpindi Pakistan
1960 (none) Nouakchott Mauritania CC
1961 Rio de Janeiro Brasília Brazil PB
1962 Butare Kigali Rwanda CC
1962 Ta’izz Sana’a North Yemen CC
1965 Mafeking Gaborone Botswana CC
1969 Rawalpindi Islamabad Pakistan MC PB
1970 Belize City Belmopan Belize (colony) PB, PT
1970 Salalah Muscat Oman PT
1974 Zomba Lilongwe Malawi CC PT
1974 Madina do Boe Bissau Guinea Bissau CC
1975 Luang Prabang Vientiane Laos
1976 Baguio Philippines PT
1976 Quezon City Manila Philippines MC
1976 Saigon Hanoi (South) Vietnam CC
1982 Colombo Kotte Sri Lanka CC, MC
1983 Abidjan Yamoussoukro Cote d’Ivoire PT
1989 Kolonia Palikir F. S. of Micronesia CC, MC
1990 Santiago Valparaíso Chile PT
1990 Aden Sana’a (South) Yemen CC
1991 Lagos Abuja Nigeria PB
1996 Dar es Salaam Dodoma Tanzania PT
1997 Almaty Astana Kazakhstan CC
1999 Bonn Berlin (West) Germany CC PT
1999 Kuala Lumpur Putrajaya Malaysia MC PT
2005 Yangon Naypyidaw Myanmar PB
2006 Koror Ngerulmud Palau PB
Notes: List of national capital city relocations since 1950.
ID - Identification
CC - Country Changed (e.g., major border change) within 10 years. This includes mergers, for
example, when Trieste was annexed into Italy. Country changes likely affect the importance of the
capital dramatically.
MC - Moved Close (within 25 km)
PT - Partial move of government (only certain functions)
PB - Purpose Built
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2.8 Appendix - Permutation Test P -values
Table 2.2: P -Values for Rio de Janeiro Population
Null dist. 1960 1970 1980 1991 1996 2000 2007 2010 Joint
{α̂p|sp ≤ s1} 0.55 0.48 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.31
{α̂p|sp ≤ 5s1} 0.58 0.50 0.43 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.34
{α̂p} 0.58 0.50 0.43 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.34
{τp = α̂p/sp} 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.51
Notes: P -values from 376 permutation tests. 68% of the permutation tests had lower pre-
treatment RMSPEs. Null distribution includes those donors that are matched at least
as well as Rio de Janeiro, those matched no more than 5 (or 10) times worse, all donors.
The first three rows compare yearly effects while the last row compares effects weighted by
pre-treatment match quality. The values correspond to Figure 2.2a.
Table 2.3: P -Values for Brasília Population
Null dist. 1960 1970 1980 1991 1996 2000 2007 2010 Joint
{α̂p|sp ≤ s1} 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
{α̂p|sp ≤ 5s1} 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
{α̂p} 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
{τp = α̂p/sp} 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: P -values from 376 permutation tests. 11% of the permutation tests had lower pre-
treatment RMSPEs. Null distribution includes those donors that are matched at least as
well as Brasília, those matched no more than 5 (or 10) times worse, all donors. The first three
rows compare yearly effects while the last row compares effects weighted by pre-treatment
match quality.The values correspond to Figure 2.2b.
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Table 2.4: Early Placebo Check: P -Values for
Rio de Janeiro Population Estimation Using
Treatment Date as 1950
Null dist. Joint
{α̂p|sp ≤ s1} 0.65
{α̂p|sp ≤ 5s1} 0.66
{α̂p} 0.66
{τp = α̂p/sp} 0.80
Notes: P -values from 376 permutation tests. 82% of
the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
Null distribution includes those donors that are matched
at least as well as Rio de Janeiro, those matched no more
than 5 (or 10) times worse, all donors. The first three
rows compare yearly effects while the last row compares
effects weighted by pre-treatment match quality.
Table 2.5: Early Placebo Check: P -Values for
Brasília Population Estimation Using
Treatment Date as 1950
Null dist. Joint
{α̂p|sp ≤ s1} 0.42
{α̂p|sp ≤ 5s1} 0.44
{α̂p} 0.45
{τp = α̂p/sp} 0.38
Notes: P -values from 376 permutation tests. 39% of
the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
Null distribution includes those donors that are matched
at least as well as Brasília, those matched no more than
5 (or 10) times worse, all donors. The first three rows
compare yearly effects while the last row compares effects
weighted by pre-treatment match quality.
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Figure 2.12: Annualized Growth Rate




























Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea, latitude,
longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for public
administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football teams
in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for control


























Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea, latitude,
longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for public
administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football teams
in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for control
from 382 permutation tests. 61% of the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
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Table 2.7: P -Values for Brasília Population Growth Rates
Null dist. 1960 1970 1980 1991 1996 2000 2007 2010 Joint
{α̂p|sp ≤ s1} 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.40 0.01
{α̂p|sp ≤ 5s1} 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.40 0.01
{α̂p} 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.40 0.01
{τp = α̂p/sp} 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.48 0.03
Notes: P -values from 382 permutation tests. 61% of the permutation tests had lower pre-
treatment RMSPEs. Null distribution includes those donors that are matched at least as
well as Brasília, those matched no more than 5 (or 10) times worse, all donors. The first three
rows compare yearly effects while the last row compares effects weighted by pre-treatment
match quality. The values correspond to Figure 2.12.
2.9 Appendix - Growth Rates
Table 2.6: P -Values for Rio de Janeiro Population Growth Rates
Null dist. 1960 1970 1980 1991 1996 2000 2007 2010 Joint
{α̂p|sp ≤ s1} 0.51 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.42 0.77 0.58 0.88 0.58
{α̂p|sp ≤ 5s1} 0.51 0.25 0.31 0.28 0.43 0.77 0.58 0.89 0.58
{α̂p} 0.51 0.25 0.31 0.28 0.43 0.77 0.58 0.89 0.58
{τp = α̂p/sp} 0.72 0.51 0.59 0.52 0.68 0.87 0.79 0.93 0.87
Notes: P -values from 382 permutation tests. 90% of the permutation tests had lower pre-
treatment RMSPEs. Null distribution includes those donors that are matched at least
as well as Rio de Janeiro, those matched no more than 5 (or 10) times worse, all donors.
The first three rows compare yearly effects while the last row compares effects weighted by
pre-treatment match quality. The values correspond to Figure 2.12.
2.10 Appendix - Weights for Matches
The following are the match variables when the response variable is demeaned
log-population
95
Table 2.8: Variable Weights and Balance (Rio de Janeiro)
Variable Weight Treated Control
Log Pop (demeaned)(1950) 0.330 0.980 0.977
Log Pop (demeaned)(1872) 0.257 -1.177 -1.172
Log Pop (demeaned)(1900) 0.143 -0.178 -0.208
Summer temp 0.104 20.542 20.044
Log Pop (demeaned)(1920) 0.068 0.252 0.270
Latitude 0.033 -22.900 -18.964
Per-capita GDP (1920) 0.018 1.206 1.584
Per-capita GDP (1939) 0.015 4.274 6.280
Winter temp 0.008 25.417 24.311
Pc GDP for pub admin (1920) 0.006 0.263 0.121
Per-capita GDP (1949) 0.006 5.388 8.707
Pop density rank (1950) 0.005 0.002 0.173
Longitude 0.003 -43.460 -45.258
Area 0.002 1,167.000 10,615.322
Pc GDP for pub admin (1939) 0.002 0.371 0.457
Distance to the sea 0.002 13.498 206.886
Rainfall 0.000 550.583 548.574
Pop rank (1950) 0.000 0.009 0.126
Notes: List of variables used in the matching procedure that produces the
synthetic control for Rio de Janeiro for the main specification where the outcome
is demeaned log population. The first column lists the relative weights produced
during the matching process. Weight indicates how useful the variable is a
predicting the pre-treatment path of the outcome. Columns 2 and 3 show the
values for the treated unit and synthetic control. The values should be similar
for those variables that have higher weights.
96
Table 2.9: Variable Weights and Balance (Brasília)
Variable Weight Treated Control
Log Pop (demeaned)(1950) 0.288 0.538 0.542
Log Pop (demeaned)(1872) 0.272 -0.495 -0.510
Log Pop (demeaned)(1900) 0.207 -0.240 -0.237
Summer temp 0.081 21.197 20.891
Log Pop (demeaned)(1920) 0.067 0.182 0.187
Latitude 0.043 -15.386 -14.350
Winter temp 0.020 23.233 23.686
Per-capita GDP (1939) 0.006 2.911 2.776
Longitude 0.004 -47.569 -46.534
Per-capita GDP (1920) 0.004 1.201 0.565
Area 0.003 53,607.000 30,463.245
Pop rank (1950) 0.003 0.364 0.372
Pc GDP for pub admin (1939) 0.002 0.136 0.149
Pop density rank (1950) 0.001 0.955 0.773
Rainfall 0.000 510.047 556.861
Pc GDP for pub admin (1920) 0.000 0.037 0.027
Per-capita GDP (1949) 0.000 1.803 4.264
Distance to the sea 0.000 863.507 309.848
Notes: List of variables used in the matching procedure that produces the
synthetic control for Brasília for the main specification where the outcome is
demeaned log population. The first column lists the relative weights produced
during the matching process. Weight indicates how useful the variable is a
predicting the pre-treatment path of the outcome. Columns 2 and 3 show the
values for the treated unit and synthetic control. The values should be similar
for those variables that have higher weights.
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Table 2.10: Top Locality Matches
Rio de Janeiro
Municipality Weight Current pop.




São Gonçalo 0.10 1,519,707
Brasília









Notes: List of municipalities with the match weight above .01 used in the creation of the synthetic
controls.
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Table 2.11: Migration Summary Information
Emigration from RJ Immigration to Brasilia
% of emigration % immigration
Place 1960 1970 1960 1970
Rondônia 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.04
Acre 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06
Amazonas 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.11
Roraima 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Pará 0.00 0.28 0.71 0.41
Amapá 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08
Maranhão 0.00 0.07 1.56 2.95
Piauí 0.00 0.07 4.02 5.18
Ceará 0.18 0.40 7.48 6.37
Rio Grande do Norte 0.26 0.27 2.03 1.89
Paraíba 0.18 0.39 5.38 5.46
Pernambuco 0.56 1.02 4.00 3.79
Alagoas 0.15 0.11 0.32 0.33
Sergipe 0.11 0.20 0.52 0.33
Bahia 0.67 0.97 6.73 6.60
Minas Gerais 4.70 3.57 15.63 22.06
Espírito Santo 0.00 1.38 1.05 0.98
Rio de Janeiro 80.56 73.17 14.81 13.72
São Paulo 7.23 8.35 7.27 4.75
Paraná 1.76 1.31 0.78 1.06
Santa Catarina 0.00 0.29 0.32 0.47
Rio Grande do Sul 0.65 0.61 0.22 0.58
Mato Grosso 0.23 0.28 0.62 0.85
Goiás 0.25 0.48 26.44 21.51
Distrito Federal 2.51 6.40
Abroad 0.10 0.38
Source: IPUMS 5% sample.
Notes: Summary information on immigration and emigration for Brazilian states.
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2.11 Appendix - Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 2.13: Estimated Population Effects - 1960
Notes: Estimation differences between each unit and their synthetic control for 1960.Predictors are
those from the standard estimations of section 2.4.2.1.
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1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Brasilia + Rio 95% CIs
Notes: Confidence intervals for control from 200 permutation tests. The permutation distribution is
constructed by drawing random pairs of donor municipalities and summing their effects. Predictors
are those from the standard estimations of section 2.4.2.1.
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Figure 2.15: Dropping Nearby Localities












1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Rio de Janeiro Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea,
latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for













1872 1900 1930 1960 2000
Year
Brasilia Control (Synth) 95% CIs
Notes: Predictors: response variables for every other pre-treatment period, area, distance to sea,
latitude, longitude, per capita municipal GDP (1920, 1939, 1949), per capita municipal GDP for
public administration (1920, 1939), yearly rainfall, winter & summer temperatures, existence football
teams in 1955, population rank (1950), population density rank (1950). Confidence intervals for
control from 376 permutation tests. 11% of the permutation tests had lower pre-treatment RMSPEs.
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Figure 2.16: Municipalities Dropped
Notes: Municipalities dropped due to possibly contamination. These municipalities have prediction
errors when estimating with treatment in 1960 for their first treatment year in the critical region of
the distribution of such errors when estimating with treatment in 1950.
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Chapter 3: Credit Constraints, Discounting and Investment in Health:
Evidence from Micropayments for Clean Water in Dhaka
3.1 Introduction
Low rates of adoption of and low willingness to pay (WTP) for preventative health
technologies pose an ongoing puzzle in development economics (Dupas, 2011; Abdul
Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, 2011). In the case of water-borne diseases, the burden
is high both in terms of poor health and cost of treatment, and inexpensive preventative
technologies are available, but WTP for products such as chlorine treatment or ceramic
filters has been observed to be low in a number of contexts (Ahuja et al., 2010; Ashraf
et al., 2010; Luoto et al., 2011; Berry et al., 2015; Guiteras et al., 2016).
Many explanations for this puzzle have been proposed, including lack of in-
formation, difficulties in learning returns, and inconvenience, effort costs or other
non-health, non-financial disutilites associated with use (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010;
Dupas, 2011). We focus on one common characteristic of many health technologies: a
relatively large up-front investment is required, while the benefits accrue over time.
This is problematic for a number of interdependent reasons. First, households may find
it difficult to borrow, especially for non-business purposes. Second, poor households
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may have high discount rates or be close to subsistence levels of consumption and
therefore be unwilling to sacrifice a large amount of current consumption. Third,
households may exhibit time-inconsistency in the form of present bias or hyperbolic
discounting (Ashraf et al., 2006). Fourth, households may be unwilling to sink a large
sum into a new technology when they are unsure of its benefits. These barriers suggest
a number of interventions to increase adoption and improve welfare. Consumers who
face liquidity constraints or exhibit present bias may find it difficult to fund purchases
even if they are willing to pay substantial amounts over time (Holla and Kremer,
2009). As a result, time payments, either micro-loans or layaways (dedicated savings),
may increase adoption and improve welfare (Mahajan and Tarozzi, 2011; Dupas and
Robinson, 2013; Tarozzi et al., 2014). When consumers have an uncertain valuation
of a new product, a free trial or money-back guarantee can allow learning at low risk
(Levine and Cotterman, 2012).
In this paper, we examine how time payment plans (either micro-loans or micro-
savings) and interventions to decrease the risk incurred while learning (a free trial and
a money-back guarantee) affect WTP and attempt to understand the mechanisms
at work. Both of these are empirically challenging. First, individuals with greater
access to finance may have a greater taste for health relative to consumption or more
resources overall. Second, even if access to finance were randomly assigned, there
are many variations possible and we would typically only observe one choice per
individual, so it would require an enormous sample size to determine which policies are
most attractive. Third, many of the underlying reasons for increased WTP (liquidity
constraints, high discount rates, present bias / hyperbolic discounting, value of low-
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risk learning) have similar empirical implications, making it difficult to identify the
underlying mechanisms.
To address these questions, we measure WTP for a high-quality ceramic water
filter in 400 households in slums of Dhaka, Bangladesh, where water quality is poor and
the burden of water-borne disease high. We use a modified Becker-Degroot-Marschak
(BDM) mechanism to elicit WTP under a variety of time payment plans, including a
lump-sum paid immediately, micro-loans and dedicated micro-savings plans of varying
duration. Crucially, we obtain valuations from each household across all payment
plans, which (a) increases power and (b) helps us investigate the mechanisms behind
differences in WTP across plans.
We find that the availability of time payments dramatically increases WTP.
While the retail price is BDT 2100 (USD 281), median WTP under a lump-sum,
up-front payment is BDT 755 (USD 10.07), but increases to BDT 1260 (USD 16.80)
with a simple 6-month loan and BDT 1530 (USD 20.40) for a 12-month loan. To
separate time preference from liquidity constraints, we elicited WTP from subjects
given layaway (dedicated micro-savings) plans with the same payment schedule as
the loans. The intuition for this approach is that, while layaway plans should be less
appealing than loans to all consumers, patient consumers who are liquidity constrained
will find the layaway relatively more appealing than will impatient consumers. To
our surprise, we found that for almost all households, WTP with a loan is virtually
identical to WTP with a layaway plan with the same payment schedule. That is,
households are willing to pay the exact same amount over 6 months to receive the
1The exchange rate during the study was roughly BDT 75 = USD 1.
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filter in 6 months as they are to receive the filter today. In a standard model where
all forms of consumption are discounted at the same rate, this implies that time
preferences are unimportant and liquidity constraints alone explain the large increase
in WTP from time payments. Alternatively, households could discount utility from
future general consumption heavily, but do not discount the utility from owning the
filter. To investigate the mechanisms at work, we estimate a simple structural model
of liquidity constraints and time preference, and find strong evidence for the existence
of credit constraints.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a brief literature
review and conceptual framework. In Section 3.3, we describe the experimental design.
In Section 3.4, we discuss the reduced-form evidence provided by our data. In Section
3.5, we propose and estimate a simple structural model of time preferences and credit
constraints. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature
Under-investment in welfare-enhancing or profitable technologies is thought to
be a commonplace problem in developing countries. There are a variety of products,
ranging from modern fertilizer to efficient cookstoves, that many poor people do not
purchase, in spite of what would appear to be large benefits (Foster and Rosenzweig,
2010). While there are many potential explanations for this seeming underinvestment,
in this section we focus on research related to time preference, liquidity constraints
and consumers’ lack of information on the effectiveness of the new product.
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While the study of the relationship between liquidity constraints and consumption
has a long history (Deaton, 1991), recent research in developing countries has focused
on the impact of credit constraints on business investment and micro-enterprise. A large
body of research shows that credit market imperfections are important impediments,
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; de Mel et al., 2008; Banerjee and Duflo, 2014), but to date
microcredit has not proved to be an effective solution (Banerjee et al., 2015b,a). A
few recent studies have found that credit-based interventions have increased takeup of
health investments (Devoto et al., 2012; Tarozzi et al., 2014; BenYishay et al., 2016)
Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) (TM) and Dupas and Robinson (2013) (DR)
both examine the relationship between non-standard time preferences and health
investments, TM studying loans for bednet purchases in Orissa, India, and DR studying
commitment savings for subject-chosen health products in Kenya. We highlight two
differences between our study and these. First, we directly compare behavior under
savings and borrowing. This is useful for policymakers as well as for understanding
behavioral mechanisms. Second, we measure effects on WTP rather than share
purchasing at a single price (TM) or total health investment or savings accumulated
(DR), so our results are informative for pricing policy.
Both consumers and producers are likely to be uncertain about the returns to
a new technology, and experimentation can be risky (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995).
Recent empirical research on the relationship between experimentation and adoption
has been mixed. Dupas (2014) finds that short-run subsidies increase long-run adoption
of insecticide-treated bednets in Kenya. Levine and Cotterman (2012) find that adding
a free trial, time payments, and the right to return increased uptake of an efficient
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charcoal stove from 5% to 45%. That study showed that either the free trial or time
payments increased uptake by about half the total effect, but did not identify what
barriers the sales offers overcame. However, experimentation can also lead to decreased
adoption if consumers find the product inconvenient or unpleasant to use (Mobarak
et al., 2012; Luoto et al., 2012).
There is substantial evidence that many people have present bias, meaning
that their subjective discount rate for short-term decisions today is higher than their
subjective discount rate for short-term decisions in the future. The most common
formulation within economics is a model that assumes there is an exponential discount
rate δ for most decisions, but an additional present bias discount rate β < 1 for all
future periods (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). The potential role of
present bias in underinvestment in health is discussed in Kessler and Zhang (2015)
and, in a development context, in Dupas (2011).
3.3 Experimental Design and Data Collection
3.3.1 Context and Object of Sale
Our sample consists of approximately 400 poor households with young children
in slums of Dhaka, Bangladesh. This population is of particular interest because of
the low-quality piped water in these neighborhoods and high burden of water-borne
disease, both generally and among young children.
The core intervention is the offer for sale of a long-lasting (18-24 months) ceramic
water filter with a retail price of approximately BDT 2100. We are interested in the
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demand for water filters because in previous research in this population found a strong
distaste for chlorine-based treatment: WTP is low, and use is low even when provided
free (Guiteras et al., 2016). The ceramic filter was popular in consumer testing in a
similar population elsewhere in Dhaka, although few households purchased the filter
at the break-even price (Luoto et al., 2011).
We begin with a simple household survey to collect basic data on demographics,
socioeconomic status, risk preferences and recent episodes of water-borne disease. We
then conduct a marketing meeting in which we explain the dangers of local water and
promote the filter as a solution. The promotional message draws on our previous work
in Dhaka with similar compounds, and combines both a positive health message as
well as a message emphasizing disgust at ingesting fecal matter in unfiltered water.
We inform the subject of the possible payment plans that might be offered in the sales
visit and instruct her to think how much her household is willing to pay for the filter
under each payment plan.2 We also explain the modified BDM mechanism (Becker et
al., 1964), described below, that we use to elicit WTP. To increase understanding, we
conduct a real-money practice round of BDM for a token item (a packet of powdered
dish detergent with a retail value of approximately BDT 10).
Two weeks later, we return for a sales visit, in which we use BDM to obtain
the households’ WTP under several different payment plans, listed in Table 3.1 and
described at greater length below. Under the lump-sum plan, the filter would be
delivered either the same day or, in a few cases when delivery was delayed, the next
2Our target respondent was the female head of household, since women typically have primary
responsibility for water collection and providing water to children. We encouraged all household
members to participate in the marketing meeting, discussion of WTP and financing, and sales process.
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day, and payment in full required upon delivery. For the loan plans, the delivery of
the filter was, again, that day or the next, with the first installment due on delivery.
For the layaway plans, the timing of payments was the same as the corresponding loan
plan, but the filter was only delivered at the time of the final payment. Payments
were collected monthly and the collections officer recorded at each visit if the filter
appeared to be in use.
Table 3.1: Offer Types
Offer type Time of payment(s) (months) Filter received (month)
Lump sum 0 0
3-month loan 0, 1, 2 0
3-month layaway 0, 1, 2 2
7-month loan 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 0
7-month layaway 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 6
12-month loan 0, 1, 2, . . . , 11 0
1-month delay 1 0
“75%, X, X” 0, 1, 2 2
Notes: In the “75%, X, X” offer, we fix the household’s first payment at 75% of the maximum
payment agreed to for a three-month loan, and the household then bids on the amount of
the last 2 payments (X). The purpose is to provide variation between current and future
payments to help identify present bias. The immediate (month=0) payment was due by the
next day.
3.3.2 WTP Data and the BDM Mechanism
To obtain precise data on WTP, for each offer type, we conduct a series of BDM
procedures, one for each offer type. In the standard implementation of BDM for a
3This need not be the case for subjects who are not expected-utility maximizers (Horowitz, 2006).
In a study of WTP for water filters in rural Ghana, Berry et al. (2015) find a gap of about USD 1
between WTP as elicited by BDM and as revealed through a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a randomized
price. While departures from expected-utility maximization could reduce our confidence in the
levels of WTP we obtain from BDM, for our findings on differences between lump-sum and time
payments, we need only for these departures not to interact with financing. Furthermore, even if
these departures do interact with financing, if this interaction also appears in market behavior then
BDM would still be informative about the effects of financing.
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single good, the subject states her maximum WTP (“bid”). If there was only one
offer type the bid is then compared against a random price (“offer”). If her bid is less
than the offer price, she does not purchase the filter. If her bid is greater than or
equal to the offer price, she purchases the filter at the offer price. For expected-utility
maximizers, the subject’s best strategy is to bid her maximum WTP truthfully.3
To obtain a subject’s WTP for a number of different offer types, we adapt BDM
into a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we obtain the subject’s bid for each
of the 8 offer types shown in Table 3.1, giving us a vector of WTP values for each
household WTPh = (WTPh,1, . . . ,WTPh,8). Then, in the second stage, we randomize
one offer type for which the BDM draw is actually taken. That is, a random offer
type t ∈ {1, . . . , 8} is chosen, we draw a random offer price ph,t, and proceed as
in a single-item BDM: if ph,t ≤ WTPh,t, the household receives the filter and pays
ph,t; if ph,t >WTPh,t, the household cannot buy the filter. One disadvantage of our
implementation was that, after extensive piloting, we found that it was necessary to
provide participants with the minimum and maximum possible lottery prices, and
to cap this range at the approximate break-even retail price of BDT 2100. This was
necessary to improve participant understanding and to maintain a sense of fairness.
However, it does mean that our WTP measure is censored, in that if a household has
a very high WTP, we will observe only the top-coded value of BDT 2100. Because of
this censoring, we will focus on quantile (median) estimates for demand data.
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3.3.2.1 Offer Types
Table 3.1 lists the main offer types. The simplest offer is a lump sum paid on
delivery which was scheduled with the family for that day or the next. We offer loans
which begin immediately and involve 3, 7 and 12 monthly payments.4 A parallel
set of plans (3 and 7 payments) are for layaway, in which households make regular
payments into a dedicated lockbox, according to the payment schedule, until they have
accumulated the offer amount. These plans are soft commitments: even though the
lockbox key is held by the organization implementing the survey,5 the lockbox itself
remains with the household and the savings will not be confiscated if the household
“defaults” by not following through on its commitment. At the time the household
is scheduled to make a deposit, field staff visit to confirm that the deposit has been
made. Households also have the option to “deposit” their money with the field staff
in exchange for a receipt.6 To control for possible anchoring or ordering effects, the
4The prompts for BDM bids are framed in terms of the monthly payment rather than the total
(e.g., “three monthly payments of BDT 400,” rather than “BDT 1,200 over three months.” However,
we also provide subjects with the total amount implied by their monthly payments if they ask, as
most pilot subjects did. The BDM draw, which determines the allocation and total price paid, is
in terms of the total amount, which is then converted back into monthly payments for the relevant
payment plan. We conduct the BDM draw in terms of the total amount for operational simplicity –
otherwise, surveyors would have to carry separate sets of price envelopes for each offer.
5The International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDRB).
6As discussed in the Introduction, the intent of the layaway plans was to separate liquidity
constraints from present bias. An alternative approach to identifying liquidity constraints would
have been to give the subject the good in question and perform a reverse BDM in which the subject
reveals the minimum amount she is willing to accept (WTA) in exchange for the good. The idea is to
remove the liquidity constraint so that any variation in minimum WTA across payment plans could
be attributed to time preference. This was not successful in piloting, for two main reasons. First, a
large majority of pilot subjects stated that they would not accept any amount in exchange for the
filter. We interpret this as some combination of a please-the-implementer effect and an endowment
effect, with the former being more likely given that subjects even refused amounts higher than the
going retail price. Second, reverse time payment plans were not perceived as credible by the subjects
– many were skeptical that we would return multiple times over several months to give them money.
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order in which plans were presented to each household was randomized to one of four
different sequences: (a) loan plans then layaway plans, where plans in each section
were ordered from shortest length to longest, (b) layaway plans then loan plans, all
presented from shortest to longest, (c) loan plans then layaway plans, all presented
from longest to shortest, (d) layaway plans then loan plans, all presented from longest
to shortest.
3.3.2.2 Free Trial and Money-Back Guarantee
We randomized two treatments: a two-week free trial and a money-back guaran-
tee. These were orthogonally randomized, so a quarter received both treatments, a
quarter received neither, and a quarter each received only one of the treatments.
Randomized Treatment 1: Free trial. The first treatment is a two-week free trial,
giving households an opportunity to learn to use the filter and to confirm whether
ease of use, taste, and other characteristics are acceptable. These households received
the filter at the marketing meeting and have if for use until the sales meeting. For
risk-averse consumers one would expect the free trial to increase WTP (Levine and
Cotterman, 2012), although there are counterexamples (Mobarak et al., 2012; Luoto
et al., 2012).
Randomized Treatment 2: Money-back guarantee or rent-to-own. One potential
barrier to adoption is that households may incur income, health or consumption
shocks that ex-post mean that money spent on a filter would have been better spent
on something else. To test whether this is an important determinant of WTP, we
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randomize whether the loan offer gives the household the option to return the product
for a partial or full refund up to a year from the sales date. With no refund, a time
payment plan is similar to a “rent-to-own” scheme, in which the subject risks losing
only accumulated payments, rather than the full lump sum. With a full or partial
refund, the loan comes to resemble the layaway plan, but with the household receiving
the flow of benefits from the product while payments are being made.
3.3.3 Data Collection and Summary Statistics
We conducted a baseline household survey at the time of the marketing meeting
to collect basic data on demographics, socioeconomic status, risk preferences and
recent episodes of water-borne disease. A final end line survey is conducted 6 months
later. Main survey collections occurred from September of 2012 to June of 2013.
Table 3.2 shows the means of demographic characteristics in our sample. It also
reports the difference across the free trial treatments (mean of those with free trial
minus those without) and across the guarantee arms. There do not appear to be large
differences across these treatments. Our measure of income is fairly noisy because of
several outliers.
3.4 Reduced-Form Evidence
3.4.1 Effects on WTP
The most salient result from the study is that time payments dramatically
increase WTP. Figure 3.1 compares the share of households willing to purchase the
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Table 3.2: Randomization Check
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Free trial(1-0) Guarantee(1-0)
Female 0.877 0.0317 0.0129
Age 31.67 -0.222 1.266
HH Education (years) 5.527 0.713∗ 0.0632
Married 0.909 0.0137 0.0137
HH size 4.188 0.0309 0.152
Rent > USD 27/month 0.779 -0.0539 0.0274
Has gas-line 0.992 0.000475 0.0157∗∗
Water in compound 0.990 -0.0113 0.0118
HH Income (USD, monthly) 368.8 61.06 10.63
Notes: 471 observations. Differences in means between those with and without
the free trial (guarantee) are shown in column 2 (3).
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
filter given a lump-sum offer with the share using the household’s maximum bid across
offers. All figures deflate cash flows by 13% per year, the approximate cost of funds for
an MFI.7 The increase in share of households willing to purchase via a time payments
plan, relative to the share willing to purchase under a lump-sum offer, is statistically
singificant at all prices above BDT 300, and the effect is 30 percentage points or more
at all prices above BDT 700. Median WTP increases from BDT 755 to 1530 for a
12-month loan. Figure 3.2 examines differences in individual household WTP. Among
households that are not censored (i.e., (i) do not have all bids at the top bid amount,
and (ii) express some positive WTP for any offer), WTP increases for most households,
with a median increase of BDT 600 (min. 0, IQR 200-1100, max. 1900).
7The commerical bank prime lending rate at the time of the study was 13% annually (CIA,
2012). Grameen Bank charges a nominal interest rate on loans of about 24% per year and pays
approximately 8.5% on savings (Roodman, 2010).
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Price (BDT, present value − 13% APR)
Max. over offers − Lump Sum
Notes: The top figure plots BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, using households’
maximum WTP across all offers (square markers) and households’ maximum WTP for an immediate
lump sum (no markers). The bottom figure plots the estimated differences (max. across all offers
relative to lump sum). Pointwise inference from logit regressions (at prices BDT 100, 300, 500, . . . ,
max). Standard errors clustered at the compound level. 388 observations. 75 BDT = 1 USD.
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of difference in household willingness to pay (WTP) under
time payments (i.e., the maximum nominal amount across all loan and layaway offers) relative to
an up-front lump-sum payment. We exclude 48 households that were top-coded (i.e., both their
lump-sum and maximum time payment WTP were at the upper bound price) and the 32 households
with zero WTP under all offers (including attriters and refusals), leaving 308 observations. 75 BDT
= 1 USD.
Even a short-term (3-month) loan significantly increases demand, which continues
as the term of the loan lengthens. This can be seen in Figure 3.3, which plots the
share of subjects willing to purchase given each loan offer.
Surprisingly, WTP given time payment layaway plans are almost identical to
loans. Figure 3.4 shows that the demand curves lie almost on top of each other, and
Figure 3.5 shows that nearly all households have identical WTP for loans and layaway
plans of the same duration. This suggests that households do not discount health
benefits in the same way as utility from general consumption.8 It is possible is that
households anchor their valuation based on the offer they consider first, or are simply
fatigued when considering later offers. However, this does not appear to be the case:
8It is possible that the layaway plan provides unique benefits, such as access to a lockbox to help
save, that offset any utility loss to delaying consumption of the filter. However, it is unlikely that
these effects would almost exactly cancel out for almost all households.
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Price (BDT, present value − 13% APR)
3 month loan 6 month loan 12 month loan
Relative to Lump sum
Notes: The top figure compares BDM demand curves across, with 90% confidence bands, loan offers:
lump-sum (no markers), 3-month (square markers), 6-month (triangles) and 12-month (diamonds).
The bottom figure plots the estimated differences for the three loan plans relative to lump-sum.
Pointwise inference from logit regressions (at prices BDT 100, 300, 500, . . . , max). Standard errors
clustered at the compound level. 388 observations. 75 BDT = 1 USD.
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the randomized order of the offers did not significantly affect the WTP prices (Table
3.3).
Table 3.3: Offer Order Effect
Loan7 Loan3





Notes: Quantile (median) regression. Standard errors in
parentheses. Includes controls for age, high rent, water
access, gas access, and education. Dependent variable is
total nominal amount in BDT (75 BDT = 1 USD). ∗ p < .1,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
The results from our randomized treatments are somewhat less striking. In
neither case (free trial, Figure 3.6; guarantee, Figure 3.7) do we see strong evidence
for an increase in demand.
3.4.2 Interpreting Reduced-Form Evidence
In this sub-section, we consider implications of the reduced-form results presented
above, in particular for understanding savings and borrowing constraints in the
population.
First, we can provide some evidence on whether households have difficulty saving
for health investment (Dupas and Robinson, 2013). A simple measure of the ability
of households to save is to compare WTP between the up-front lump-sum payment
with the one-month delayed plan. If a household’s WTP with a one-month delay is
no greater than its WTP given a lump-sum today, this suggests that the household
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Price (BDT, present value − 13% APR)
Layaway (3 month) Loan (3 month)
Notes: The figure compares BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, for 3-month loans
(square markers) and 3-month layaway plans (no markers). Pointwise inference from logit regressions
(at prices BDT 100, 300, 500, . . . , max). Standard errors clustered at the compound level. 388
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Price (BDT, present value − 13% APR)
Layaway (7 month) Loan (7 month)
Notes: The figure compares BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, for 7-month loans
(square markers) and 7-month layaway plans (no markers). Pointwise inference from logit regressions
(at prices BDT 100, 300, 500, . . . , max). Standard errors clustered at the compound level. 388
observations. 75 BDT = 1 USD.
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of difference in household willingness to pay (WTP) for
3-month loans relative to 3-month layaway plans. We exclude 0 households that were top-coded (i.e.,
both their lump-sum and maximum time payment WTP were at the upper bound price,) and 32
households with zero WTP for both offers (including attriters and refusals), leaving 356 observations.
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Difference in WTP: Loan (7 month) − Layaway (7 month)
BDT, present value − 13% APR
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of difference in household willingness to pay (WTP) for
7-month loans relative to 7-month layaway plans. We exclude 0 households that were top-coded (i.e.,
both their lump-sum and maximum time payment WTP were at the upper bound price) and 33
households with zero WTP for both offers (including attriters and refusals), leaving 355 observations.
75 BDT = 1 USD.
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Notes: The figure compares BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, between free trial
and no free trial households, given a offer. Standard errors clustered at the compound level. 189
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No free trial Free trial
Notes: The figure compares BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, between free trial
and no free trial households, given a offer. Standard errors clustered at the compound level. 189
observations. 75 BDT = 1 USD.
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Notes: The figure compares BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, between free trial and
no free trial households, for the household’s maximum (nominal) WTP across all offers. Standard
errors clustered at the compound level. 189 observations. 75 BDT = 1 USD.
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Notes: The figure compares BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, between guarantee
and no guarantee households, given a offer. Standard errors clustered at the compound level. 192
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No guarantee Guarantee
Notes: The figure compares BDM demand curves, with 90% confidence bands, between guarantee
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finds it difficult to save. In fact, 53.7% of the sample does not have a higher WTP for
the delayed plan than lump sum, implying that the majority of households do have
difficulty saving. On the other hand, among households that can save, this one-month
delay is meaningful, since on average the delayed plan allows households to increase
the WTP by 20.6%. This increase by allowing an extra month is roughly consistent in
terms of magnitudes with the 45.5% from having two extra months in the 3-month
plan.
Second, following Attanasio et al. (2008) and Karlan and Zinman (2008), we can
test for the presence of credit constraints by measuring whether household WTP (in
net present value terms) increases with the length of the loan. If a household does not
face credit constraints in that it can borrow or save at a prevailing market interest rate
without restriction, then the household’s WTP would be equal in net present value
across all payment plans, regardless of the household’s time preferences. Therefore, if
the household’s WTP increases with the length of the loan maturity, this is evidence
of credit constraints.9 In Table 3.4, we show the results of regressions of deflated
WTP on the length of the loan. In column 1, the dependent variable is WTP, deflated
by a uniform interest rate of 26%, twice the average business business loan rate. We
include household fixed effects and each household provides three observations, WTP
from the 3-, 7- and 12-month loans. In column 2, we construct individual-specific
interest rates by calculating the interest rate necessary for the household’s WTP for
the 3-month loan to be equal in real terms to the household’s WTP under a lump sum.
We then apply these individual-specific interest rates to the household’s WTP for
9Friction costs associated with meetings would bias our results in the opposite direction.
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the 7- and 12-month loans, and use these deflated WTPs as the dependent variables.
Again, we include household fixed effects. In both specifications, the maturity length
has a statistically and significant and economically meaningful positive effect on WTP,
which suggests that households, on average, face important credit constraints.
Table 3.4: Maturity Effect
(1) (2)
Loan PV (Const) Loan PV (Ind)





HH FEs yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The first
model calculates the loan present value using a constant
annual 26%. The second model calculates loan present values
using individual rates derived from the 3-installment plan
(compared to lump-sum). Units are BDT (75 BDT = 1 USD).
Top-coded values are excluded. ∗ p < .1,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Additional reduced-form evidence for credit constraints can be found by looking
at the 1-month delay and 3-month plan. With perfect liquidity, we would observe that










where R is the repayment rate (one plus the interest rate). Then
p1dly = p3m
(




With monthly interest rates small (i.e. R ≈ 1), then the nominal totals of both (p1dly
and 3p3m) should be approximately the same. In reality, the average value of the
3-month loan value is 28.9% higher on average, which is economically significant.
Finally, the magnitude of this maturity effect suggests that some households
have very high rates of subjective discounting. Even among households whose bids do
not suggest they are savings-constrained, we observe a sharp increase in WTP as loan
length increases from 3 months to 7 months and then to 12. It is difficult to attribute
these increases to liquidity constraints alone. As a simple illustrative example, consider
a household with a WTP of $20 for a 7-month loan. This is approximately equivalent
to USD 0.095 per day over the course of the 7- month loan, which is slightly less
than 1% of mean household income (approximately USD 10 per day). A 12-month
loan reduces the cost to the household’s daily consumption to approximately USD
0.055 per day over the course of the 12-month loan. Even extremely risk-averse
households are unlikely to find a difference of USD 0.04 per day so substantial that
they would strongly prefer the 12-month loan to the 7-month loan, so it seems unlikely
that liquidity constraints alone can explain the observed increase in WTP from 7- to
12-month loans.
3.5 Estimating Preferences and Constraints
Our reduced-form empirical analysis provides strong evidence that micro-loans
and micro-savings significantly increase WTP. To assess the relative importance of
credit constraints and time preferences in explaining this fact, we turn to a simple
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structural model. We designed our experiment to provide clean identification of
preferences versus constraints by using within-household differences in WTP between
micro-loans and micro-savings. However, the surprising fact that subjects’ WTP for
micro-loans and micro-savings plans were almost identical means that this strategy is
no longer viable. Instead, to estimate the structural model, we exploit differences in
households’ WTP across loan offers with different loan duration and different timing
of payments.
3.5.1 Utility
The household receives utility from consumption and from owning the filter.
The lifetime benefit to the household of owning the filter is B. Given that households
appear indifferent to when they receive the filter, there is no discounting of B. The
household’s per-period (monthly) utility from general consumption is
u (ct) = u (y − p̄t) ,
where y is monthly income, assumed for simplicity to be constant, and p̄t is the amount
the household pays for the filter in period t.
In the model, we limit the household’s planning horizon to 12 months. This
is a largely innocuous assumption, because all financial transactions with regards to
the filter will be complete within 12 months. We assume the household discounts its
utility from general consumption exponentially with discount rate δ. If the household
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does not purchase the filter, its total utility is










If the household does purchase the filter and makes a sequence of payments {p̄t}, its
total utility is







u (y − p̄t)
}
+B.
A household is indifferent between not purchasing and purchasing with a sequence







[u (y)− u (y − p̄t)] = B. (3.1)












where η = −u′′(y)/u′(y) measures utility curvature (the coefficient of absolute risk




We denote the payment plan (i.e. the payments in our micro-loan) as a sequence
{pt}, which we distinguish from the household’s net payment sequence {p̄t}. These two
can differ because the household may borrow from other sources or, having previously
borrowed, may need to repay these outside loans. We denote these “outside” payments
as ft, so in any period t,
pt = p̄t + ft. (3.3)
That is, if in a period t the household owes an installment pt on its micro-loan, it can
pay this installment p̄t by forgoing consumption in period t , by borrowing ft from
an outside source, or some combination of the two. Equivalently, the household’s net
payment for the filter in a period t is
p̄t = pt − ft. (3.4)
If a household borrows in a period t, ft > 0, while if a household is repaying outside
loans, then ft < 0.
Rather than build credit constraints from microfoundations, we take a reduced-
form approach and model credit constraints as a nonlinear cost-of-borrowing function,
which for simplicity we approximate as a quadratic. To develop the notation, first
suppose that the household does not face any credit market imperfections, and can
borrow freely at a gross monthly interest rate R1. Then, if the household borrows an
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Now we introduce our reduced-form model of credit constraints: rather than repaying
an amount with net present value equal to b, the household must make payments {pt}





= R̃0 + b+ R̃2b
2 = q̃(b), (3.6)
where R̃0 + R̃2b2 is the penalty for being constrained. So, for example, if a household
borrows an amount b for one period at time τ , then at time τ + 1 it owes an amount
q (b) defined by the following quadratic function:
q (b) = R0 +R1b+R2b
2, (3.7)
where R0 = R̃0 ·R1, and R2 = R̃2 ·R1.
This extends the standard transaction-cost model of loans (e.g., Helms and Reille,
2004) by adding the quadratic term R2. Adding this term is attractive for several
reasons: (a) the observed repayment rate q(b)/b is not necessarily declining in b; (b) it
is better able to approximate situations where there are fixed limits on the amounts
a household can borrow, i.e. where the borrowing costs function would be vertical.
Possible micro-foundations for a quadratic-shaped borrowing cost function include (a)
it incorporates the idea that with multiple sources of limited funds a household will
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choose the cheaper options first, and (b) if lenders expect that larger loans are less
likely to be paid back they will charge higher effective interest rates for larger loans.
We restrict outside borrowing as follows: the household may borrow the same
amount b for each month of the micro-loan, and then it must repay its outside
borrowing within three months. That is, during the term of the micro-loan, it pays
pt each month, with p̄t of this amount coming from forgone consumption and b of
this amount from outside borrowing, i.e. ft = b in equations 3.3 and 3.4. Then,
in the three months after the formal micro-loan is complete, the household makes
payments r with net present value q̃ (b), i.e. ft = −r in equation 3.4. We make this
restriction for simplicity, but it is a reasonable assumption in an environment where
most moneylending is fairly short-term. For a plan of N payments, the above leads












As an example, imagine a household is deciding the maximum monthly payment
p they are willing to make in a three-month loan. Rather than forgo the full amount
p during the three months of repayment, the household can borrow monthly amounts
b from an outside source, so that its consumption only drops by p̄t<3 = p − b over
the three months of the formal loan. Then, over the three months after the formal
loan, the household must repay its source of outside borrowing a monthly amount
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p̄t≥3 = r for three months, where r is determined by q(b). Outside credit would be
most attractive for shorter plans as there is more opportunity for smoothing.
In specifying the credit environment in this way, we are not claiming that
households literally managed their finances as we have described. Rather, our goal is
to model the essential features of an environment like that described in Collins et al.
(2009), where households have multiple possible sources of funds, whether short-term
informal borrowing or deferring other obligations, and that the household incurs a
fixed cost for drawing on these funds (thus the transactions cost term R0) and finds it
increasingly difficult or costly to obtain larger amounts (thus the quadratic term R2).
3.5.3 Household’s Optimization Problem
We now consider the household’s maximum WTP for the filter with a given micro-
loan plan. The micro-loan plan is a sequence of payments {pt}, and the household must
decide on {p∗t}, the most it is willing to pay given its preferences and the constraints
that it faces. Recall from Equation 3.2 that a household with preferences {B, δ, η}
(valuation of the filter, discounting and utility curvature, respectively) is indifferent
between not purchasing the filter and purchasing the filter for a sequence of total












Given the credit environment the {R0, R1, R2}, the household’s best strategy is to
make the highest possible bid {p∗t} such that the indifference condition 3.2 holds, while
133
selecting the optimal amount of outside borrowing {b∗t} and implied repayments {f ∗t }
to maximize its utility. If borrowing costs are sufficiently high, optimal borrowing
may be zero.
The solution for the optimal {p∗t} is derived in Appendix 3.7. Intuitively, we can
think of the household as optimizing in the following way. Suppose that the household
is considering making a bid {pt} for the filter. Given this bid {pt}, the household will
choose the optimal amount of borrowing to maximize its utility over the 12-month
horizon, which will result in net payments {p̄t}. If these net payments {p̄t} are such
that the left-hand side of 3.2 is less than the right-hand side, then the household
should increase its bid {pt}. Similarly, if these net payments {p̄t} are such that the
left-hand side of 3.2 is greater than the right-hand side, then the household should
decrease {pt}.
3.5.4 Identification
To build intuition for how the parameters are identified, we show in Figure 3.8
the effects of varying each parameter individually on the profile of BDM bids across
payment plans. In Figure 3.8a, we examine the effect of R0, the fixed cost of borrowing.
Initially, as R0 increases from 0 to 20, the largest effect comes in the household’s WTP
for the 7-month loan, since the household no longer finds it worthwhile to borrow from
outside sources to smooth consumption. WTP for the 12-month loan is unaffected,
since the household does not need to resort to outside borrowing for the 12-month loan.
WTP for shorter durations are less affected because, in spite of the fixed cost, the
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household still finds it worthwhile to borrow from outside sources. As R0 continues to
increase, WTP is depressed for shorter-term plans, since the increased fixed cost makes
it no longer worthwhile to borrow from outside sources to supplement the “inside
finance” provided by these plans. Figure 3.8b shows that increasing the cost of capital,
R1, pushes down the WTP profile for all durations except the 12-month loan, in
which the household is not borrowing. Figure 3.8c shows that increasing the quadratic
term the cost of capital, R2, has the largest effect on short-term plans: the household
borrows more from outside sources, so the quadratic term has a bigger impact on
borrowing costs for these short-term plans. Figure 3.8d shows that increasing the
household’s discount rate δ increases the household’s WTP in all plans. This is because
a household that is more impatient values future consumption less, and so is more
willing to sacrifice future consumption to obtain the filter. Increasing δ has a larger
effect on longer-duration loans (7-month) since because δ compounds: the household
downweights the loss of consumption in period t by 1/ (1 + δ)t, and so sacrificing
consumption in months t = 6, 7, 8, . . . carries only a small utility cost for households
with high δ. Figures 3.8e and 3.8f show that utility curvature (η) and the monetized
filter value (w) are not well identified separately in the current model; they both















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For each household i, our data consist of the household’s bids on each of
the M offers, pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,M), i.e., lump-sum, one-month delay, 3-, 7-, and 12-
month loan. The parameters of our model are {B, δ, η, R0, R1, R2}, where {B, δ, η}
describe a household’s preferences (valuation of the filter, discounting and utility
curvature, respectively) and {R0, R1, R2} describe the household’s credit environment.
In principle, all of these parameters vary by household. However, since we have only 5
data points per household, we cannot estimate all of the parameters at the household
level. We divide the parameters into population-level and individual-level groups. For
individual parameters, we choose ωi = {Bi, R2i, δi}, as we believe these are likely to
vary the most in the population and allow us to be able to distinguish basic preferences
from credit constraints. Population parameters are then α = {R0, R1, η}.
We estimate the model in an iterative two-step process. To build intuition, we
first describe this process as if pi were not censored (recall that bids were top-coded at
the approximate break-even price of BDT 2100), and then describe our modification
to account for censoring.
First, note that the household’s optimization provides a mapping from parameters
(ωi, α) to predicted WTP p̂i = (p̂i,1, . . . , p̂i,M). For each plan m, p̂im is the maximum
of the predicted WTP assuming no other borrowing and of the WTP assuming outside
borrowing. For the no borrowing condition we solve Equation 3.2 for when monthly
forgone consumption is the monthly filter price and there are no effects after the plan
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is finished. For the borrowing condition, we use the aggregate repayment equation
plus the first order condition from Equation 3.2 to determine the maximum WTP.
The intuition for our estimation strategy is to choose the value of the parameters
that minimizes the difference between actual bids pi and predicted bids p̂i. We start
with initial guesses for the population-level parameters α(0). We then iterate the
following procedure:
1. Given current population level estimates α(j), we choose household-specific









(j), pim) ∀i (3.9)
Ψim(ωi, α









where Ψim is the log-likelihood of the parameters yielding the stated WTP for
person i and plan m, the summation is over plans m, pim is the observed WTP
for individual i for plan m, and p̂m(ωi, α) is the predicted WTP for plan m given
the parameters (i.e. the maximum WTP given parameters {ωi, α(j)}).
































where the outer summation is over subjects i.
3. We repeat steps 1-2 until convergence.
In each step we estimate the parameters of interest via maximum likelihood. With
current candidate parameters and the parameters taken as given in each round, we
predict the WTP for each individual. The WTP is the highest price that allows the
family through some amount of borrowing to be indifferent between purchasing the
filter at the price and having no filter. We solve then for the amount of borrowing
from outside sources that maximizes the WTP while keeping the family indifferent.
We can then determine the error between predicted and observed WTPs which we
assume is normally distributed and independent across individuals and plans. We
weight deviations between predicted and observed bids equally for each offer.
Since observed WTPs are censored from above, we adjust the likelihood function
in a Tobit-style fashion, replacing Ψim(ωi, α(j), pim) from Equation 3.10 with
Ψim(ωi, α



















where ptop is the top-coded amount and 1 {·} is the indicator function.
During estimation, parameters are constrained to be non-negative. For all
parameters except R2i, this restriction is natural. For R2i, in principle borrowing costs
could be concave (R2i < 0), but we believe this restriction is reasonable given the
borrowing environment.
3.5.6 Structural Results
The values of the structural parameters are reported in Table 3.5, and distribu-
tions for individual-level parameters are shown in Figure 3.9a. The population-level
(i.e., not household-varying) parameters R0, R1 and η are significantly different than
zero (p < 0.001 in all cases). The point estimates for R0 (BDT 117) and R1 (a gross
monthly interest rate of 1.012, approximately equal to a net annual interest rate of a
2.4%) are reasonable.
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Table 3.5: Estimated Structural Parameters
Estimates
R0 (borrowing fixed cost) 116.9∗∗∗
(11.50)
R1 (borrowing repayment rate) 1.012∗∗∗
(0.0117)
R2i (borrowing quadratic cost): median 0.0000597
(0.000139)
R2i (borrowing quadratic cost): share positive 0.509∗∗∗
(0.0288)
δi (monthly discount rate): median 0.180∗∗∗
(0.0301)
wi (monetized filter value, BDT): median 1768.7∗∗∗
(174.7)
η (utility curvature) 0.0102∗∗∗
(0.000194)
Observations 291
Notes: Estimate of structural parameters from WTP data.
75 BDT = 1 USD. Bootstrap p-values (399 reps).
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
While the median estimated R2i is not significantly different from zero, over half
of the point estimates are positive, as shown in Figure 3.9a. For a large fraction of the
population, the effective cost of borrrowing large sums is extremely high. 3.10 plots
the amount a household must repay for a one period loan (the q (b) function from
Equation 3.7) across the distribution of R2i. At the 75th percentile of R2i, a loan of
BDT 250 would require a repayment of nearly BDT 1,000, and for the top quintile of
R2i, borrowing just BDT 100 is prohibitively costly.
We estimate quite high discount rates for non-health utility, as shown in Figure
3.9b: the median estimated discount rate δi is 18.9% per month, and the 75th
percentile is approximately 50% per month. This is extraordinarily high – a 50%
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Figure 3.9: CDFs of Estimated Household-Varying Structural Parameters
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Notes: This figure plots the amount due on a one month loan for different values of the borrowing
cost parameters R0 and R2i. R1 is held fixed at the estimated value of 1.012. The solid line
(“Unconstrained”) represents an unconstrained borrower with R0 = 0 and R2i = 0. The remaining
lines represent borrowing costs for individuals at the indicated quantiles of the estimated distribution
of R2i. In each of these cases, the borrower must pay the estimated fixed cost R0 = 116.9.
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monthly discount rate implies that USD 100 in one year is worth about USD 0.75
today. While we believe that impatience with respect to general consumption is an
important feature of these households’ economic lives, we suspect that features not
captured by the model – in particular, difficulty saving – are contributing to this
result. In our model, utility is discounted exponentially, but generalizing to hyperbolic
discounting would be unlikely to explain this particular puzzle, since the estimated
discount rates are driven primarily by differences in valuation between the 7-month
and 12-month loans, and the difference in immediate payment due between these two
plans is small. Finally, Figure 3.9c shows that our estimates of wi, the monetized
utility value of the filter, are plausible, with a median of BDT 1770 (USD 23.5).
Using these estimated parameters, we can conduct the counterfactual experiment
of eliminating credit constraints by setting R0 = R2 = 0. The median WTP for a
3-month loan plan increases by BDT 347, which is equivalent to an increase in the
value of the filter by 53%.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that micro-loans dramatically increase willingness to
pay (WTP) for water filters among poor households in slums of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Surprisingly, micro-savings plans have an equal effect, indicating that households are
willing to save to receive a filter in the future. Micro-savings may be a useful option
for an NGO that is concerned about its ability to enforce the terms of a micro-loan.
Of course, micro-savings requires that the household trust the institution holding
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its savings, and our context may be somewhat unusual given how highly regarded
ICDDRB is in the community. Still, even in settings where it may be more difficult to
establish trust, this striking result suggests that more enterprises should experiment
with layaway plans and variations, such as dedicated savings accounts held by a trusted
third party. Developing technologies to facilitate micro-payments, such as mobile
money, may make it feasible to offer micro-payment schemes without incurring large
collection costs.
In examining the WTP data from our experiment to understand the mechanisms
behind the large increase in WTP, we find evidence of important financial frictions.
Many households appear to find it difficult to save, and many households face signif-
icant credit constraints. Using the estimates from our structural model, we find a
counterfactual setting that removing credit constraints is equivalent to increasing the
household’s value of the filter by 53%. Furthermore, a large fraction of households
appear to discount general consumption heavily, suggesting that plans similar to
Save More Tomorrow may be useful for social enterprises marketing health goods
(Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). Finally, one important limitation of our model is that
it does not capture short-term (within-month) savings constraints, and these may
be driving some of the extremely high discount rates we estimate. The existence of
such short-term credit constraints points to the value of more research on the value of
flexible micro-payments that can be adapted to a household’s individual circumstances,
such as daily fluctuations in income (Collins et al., 2009).
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3.7 Appendix A: Household’s Optimal Bid
In this Appendix, we derive the household’s optimal BDM bid {p∗t} given its
preferences and the credit environment it faces. If the household borrows b during the





















2)R̃ = p̂ (3.14)
and the WTP identifies their indifference point (updating equation 3.1)
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δt = w (3.15)
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This is a quadratic function of p.
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we could substitute in for p̂ and solve for b, but we instead substitute out b and solve
for p̂ using equation 3.14.










































































ηp2 + p− w 1− δ
δγ(1− δN)
= 0
The WTP process for a payment plan then identifies maxp,b,p̂ p such that either
b, p̂ > 0 and equations 3.15 and 3.13 hold, or b = p̂ = 0 and equation 3.17 holds.
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